

AGAINST POGGE'S 'COSMOPOLITANISM'*

Uwe Steinhoff

Abstract

Thomas Pogge labels the idea that each person owes each other person equal respect and concern 'ethical cosmopolitanism' and correctly states that it is a 'non-starter'. He offers as an allegedly more convincing cosmopolitan alternative his 'social justice cosmopolitanism'. I shall argue that this alternative fails for pretty much the same reasons that 'ethical cosmopolitanism' fails. In addition, I will show that Pogge's definition of cosmopolitanism is misleading, since it actually applies to ethical cosmopolitanism and not to social justice cosmopolitanism. This means that cosmopolitanism as defined by Pogge is wrong in the light of his own arguments and that Pogge is not even a cosmopolitan in the sense of his own definition. I will further show that he is also not a cosmopolitan if cosmopolitanism is defined as a philosophical position involving the claim that state borders have no fundamental moral significance.

1. Against Pogge's 'Social Justice Cosmopolitanism'

The most radical interpretation of the principle of equal respect and concern would claim that *each person owes each other person* equal respect and concern. In conversations with liberal egalitarians one hears this claim quite often. In writing, however, it is not that widespread. Ronald Dworkin, for example, who has coined the term 'principle of equal respect and concern', does *not* make this claim.¹ Instead he says: 'Government must not only treat people with concern and respect, but with equal concern and respect.'²

The reason why one does not encounter the more radical claim that often in writing is probably that it is simply absurd, since one definitely does not owe equal respect and concern to one's nice sister and to her rapist. Thomas Pogge, to his credit, is one of the few egalitarians (as far as I am aware: the only) who explicitly acknowledge the incorrectness of the radical claim, which he calls 'ethical cosmopolitanism'.³ He states:

... a cosmopolitan conception of ethics is implausible. Human beings need to have the option, at least, to have special relationships with friends and family that cause their conduct to be at variance with the cosmopolitan requirement of impartiality. . . . So, ethical cosmopolitanism strictly conceived is a non-starter.⁴

Indeed, it is. But what is the starter then? One possibility would be to move directly to Dworkin's claim that *governments owe their citizens* equal respect and concern. However, Pogge's position is somewhat different and seems to lie *between* 'ethical cosmopolitanism' on the one hand and Dworkin's position on the other. He addresses not just 'governments' as bearers of the duty of equal respect and concern, but all adult persons. Yet, he attempts to

* This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: "Against Pogge's 'Cosmopolitanism'", *Ratio* (2013, Online First), which has been published in final form at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rati.12013/abstract>.

¹ Certain remarks of his could even be interpreted, and are tentatively so interpreted by Narveson, as rejecting this claim. See Ronald Dworkin, 'Comment on Narveson: In Defense of Equality', *Social Philosophy & Policy* 1 (1983/84), pp. 24-40, at 31-32; and Jan Narveson, 'Reply to Dworkin', *Social Philosophy & Policy* 1 (1983/84), pp. 41-44, at 41-42.

² Ronald Dworkin, 'Taking Rights Seriously', p. 272-73, my emphasis.

³ Thomas Pogge, 'Cosmopolitanism', Robert E. Goodin, Philip Pettit, and Thomas Pogge (eds.), *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2012), pp. 312-31, esp. 312-13 and 328.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 328.

temper, as it were, this duty through the mediation of institutions. It is worth quoting him here at length:

Cosmopolitanism is often dismissed as a view that leaves no room for any kind of partiality towards family, friends or personal projects ... Any plausible variant of cosmopolitanism must be able to distance itself from this caricature. Variants of social justice cosmopolitanism do so by distinguishing different domains of human life and then prescribing cosmopolitan impartiality for only one of these: for the design and administration of social institutions. The general idea of such a division by domain is familiar from the case of judges and referees who must be scrupulously impartial, but only when acting in their respective roles. . . . All adults are supposed to be impartial in certain domains – when we serve as jurors, certainly, and also when we speak, act or vote as citizens. . . . Social justice cosmopolitans apply this idea more generally . . . : when human agents weigh in on the design of transnational institutional arrangements, they ought to set aside their personal projects and allegiances as well as their national loyalties so as to take impartial account of the interests of all individuals affected by these institutional arrangements.⁵

This is certainly not a demand for *equal respect and concern* or for *impartiality*. Rather, it is a demand for *restricted* partiality. Pogge here says: yes, you are *allowed* to be partial towards your family and friends; yes, you can offer them more concern than strangers. *Only* when it comes to the design and administration of certain institutions must you be impartial and give everybody equal consideration.

In fact, Pogge does not just think that partiality towards family and friends is permissible (outside of the design and administration of certain institutions), he also explicitly denies that ‘in the absence of special relationships, human beings owe equal consideration’ (and I agree):

... it seems perfectly permissible for someone to help one needy stranger and not another (even when the latter’s needs are somewhat greater), to give to one beggar and not to another, to pay one poor stranger’s medical treatment and not another’s, and so on. And one may do this because one likes the story of the one, or her face, or because one is in a good mood, or for no reason at all.⁶

Thus, Pogge is an ardent defender of the permissibility of partiality and unequal consideration – *except* when it comes to the design and administration of certain (international⁷) institutions. But how does he *justify* this exception? His remarks in the quote before footnote cue 5 look like an attempt at justification.

However, I have come across the objection, rather surprising to me, that what I describe in the next paragraph as Pogge’s justification or argument isn’t his argument at all. In reply, first, I think that in the light of the quote it is quite clear that, yes, it really is at least *one* of his arguments. (In a moment, however, we will see that he might still have a second argument. After all, he tries ‘another way of restraining a cosmopolitan conception of ethics’;⁸ yet, the problem is that this other way cannot justify the remaining egalitarian element in his social justice cosmopolitanism.) Second, even if my five objections can obviously not undermine his (first) argument if it is not an argument of his at all, they still

⁵ Ibid., pp. 320–21.

⁶ Ibid., p. 329.

⁷ Of course, it seems that Pogge allows national institutions to favour the nationals; however, those nationals themselves would have to be treated equally.

⁸ Pogge, ‘Cosmopolitanism’, p. 328.

show that Pogge's claim that people have to be impartial in the design and administration of the institutions he is concerned with is *wrong*. They would, incidentally, also still show this if not *all* of them were correct (but, of course, I think they are).

So let us suppose (and be it only for the sake of argument) that the remarks in the above quote are Pogge's argument for a moral requirement of impartiality in the design and administration of certain institutions. If so, then one cannot help but note a certain irony in this way of arguing for impartiality. After all, normally defenders of impartiality try to make it compatible with the obvious importance of special relations or responsibilities by giving a 'justification' of the latter in terms of the former. Impartially considered, the defenders say, special responsibilities can be a good thing; and therefore the clash between impartiality and special responsibilities can be avoided.⁹ Pogge, however, argues *exactly the other way around*. After all, jurors have a *special responsibility*, a role responsibility, in this case, to be impartial. So here impartiality is grounded in a special responsibility.

This observation need not undermine Pogge's argument. Five further observations do, however. First, abstract talk about 'impartiality' is not particularly useful. In the same text the above quote is taken from, Pogge explains impartiality by saying that

a cosmopolitan moral criterion takes each included human individual into account symmetrically. Economists call this the Anonymity Condition: that a certain number of included individuals experience a certain fate or treatment enters the assessment in the same way, regardless of who these individuals are.¹⁰

However, if *that* is all what 'impartiality' means, then it is perfectly compatible with *unequal* respect and concern, including with racism.¹¹ Knowing *who* exactly a person is does not exclude the possibility of knowing *what* the person is and which properties the person has and what she or he has done. In fact, a judge is *not* expected to treat guilty and innocent persons with equal respect and concern. He has to *respect* the *rights* of both groups, of course, but nothing is added if we say he has to respect them 'equally'. Adding an 'equally' here amounts merely to what Raz calls 'rhetorical egalitarianism'.¹² And the judge is certainly not required to be as *concerned* about the fate of the guilty murderer as he is about the fate of the innocent person. What people nowadays *mean* by saying that a judge has to be impartial is merely that he is not to treat whites better than blacks, men better than women, Christians better than Muslims, etc. They do *not* mean, however, that he is not to treat innocent people better than guilty ones. In other words, they do not mean that he has to be impartial in the sense of *equal concern*, but only impartial in the sense of a consistent application of the law. More importantly still: by executing the law the judge is executing the unequal respect and concern the *law* or those who have made it show towards murderers on the one hand and their victims on the other. Thus, *even if* it were true that the *judge* has to be equally concerned about the guilty and the innocent, it is certainly not true that in the *design* of legal institutions people have to show equal concern for innocent and for guilty people.

Second, Pogge is wrong in claiming that we 'are supposed to be impartial . . . when we speak, act or vote as citizens'.¹³ The overwhelming majority of voters certainly believe, and

⁹ See for example Charles Jones, *Global Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 120–8; and Peter Singer, *One World: The Ethics of Globalization* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 154–67.

¹⁰ Pogge, 'Cosmopolitanism', p. 316.

¹¹ The anonymity condition corresponds to Mackie's first level of universalization. See John L. Mackie, *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 83–90.

¹² Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 227–29.

¹³ Note that Pogge is not saying here that equal respect and concern is expressed by an equal right to vote (and, indeed, such a right is compatible with unequal respect and concern, as most liberal egalitarians themselves are

correctly so, to be within their rights to vote for parties that promote *their* interests. Of course, there are limits, but within those limits partiality is quite acceptable. Voting is simply not the same as acting as a juror.

Thirdly and even more importantly, voters as voters must set clear limits to any egalitarian predilections they may have. A voter would be *unduly* partial to her own ideology if she indeed treated *all* citizens with *equal* respect and concern. For example, imagine it had been established that, all else being equal, outlawing ‘even’ certain ‘minor’ forms of sexual abuse¹⁴ would make the 10 million non-abusing citizens very happy, each would get around 100 happiness points this way. However, the would-be abusers, fearing prison, would be enormously unhappy, only reaching around 10 happiness points. Yet, by introducing the abuse compensation law, which legalizes certain forms of sexual abuse but provides for significant state sponsored compensation to the victims, the overall happiness of the non-abusing citizens would sink to 40-60 points and the happiness of the abusers would raise to 40-60 points. Thus, equal respect and concern (if taken seriously) for the interests of all citizens would certainly oblige a voter to vote for the abuse compensation law or, all else being equal, for a party that promotes it. But, of course, that only shows that equal respect and concern must be rejected. The non-abusing citizens do *not* owe equal respect and concern to the abusers. In fact, they owe it to potential victims to be partial towards *them*.

Fourth, *even a judge or a juror* cannot be (normatively) expected to be completely impartial. Of course, normally jurors do not have to decide about the guilt or innocence of their own child. However, what if someone is indeed made juror in a case concerning her own son? We certainly cannot *blame* her for being partial towards her son. As Pogge himself admits, ‘it would be morally offensive to try to shape mothers, say, to be animated by the same impartial concern for all children that we rightly expect from social institutions’.¹⁵ Indeed, but then it would also seem to be morally offensive to expect her to switch her partiality on and off like a bedside lamp, depending on context. It seems to be a somewhat simplistic account of morality to deny that the mother in this juror example is in a genuine *moral dilemma*. Her special or role responsibility towards her son does not just vanish because she now has been burdened with an *additional* and countervailing special or role responsibility, namely that of a juror. Why should one role responsibility here completely override or ‘exclude’ the other, as Pogge claims?¹⁶ The mother’s responsibility to her son remains, and in my view (and, I suppose, in the view of most other people) she is entirely *justified* in putting even more effort in emphasizing the exculpatory evidence than she would in case the defendant were not her son. Contrary to Pogge’s claim, she is *not* morally required to be ‘scrupulously impartial’. In fact, to my ears Pogge’s claim that ‘in respect to their responsibilities in regard to social institutions . . . human agents must completely set aside

eager to point out when arguing for redistributive policies). Pogge is saying here that we ‘are supposed to be impartial . . . when we speak, act or vote as citizens’. So *the single individuals*, according to Pogge, have to be impartial *in their exercise* of their right to vote.

¹⁴ I talk about ‘minor’ forms because certain forms of sexual abuse are beyond compensation in the sense that a person in Rawls’s original position, having at her disposal general knowledge about the traumatic effects of different kinds of abuse as well as about the effects of certain kinds of compensation, would prefer an absolute prohibition of certain kinds of abuse to a permission that is combined with a mandatory compensation for the victims.

¹⁵ Pogge, ‘Cosmopolitanism’, p. 323.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 329. I have encountered the objection that the practice of juror screening is strong evidence for Pogge’s point that we are already committed to something like impartiality in the administration of social institutions. Actually, however, that practice only shows that ‘we’ are trying to get impartial juries, it does not in the least show that we think that the mother in my example who happens to land in the jury despite ‘our’ screening efforts acts unjustifiably by being partial. In fact, it might also show a commitment to not throwing persons in such dilemmatic situations in the first place, where this commitment would be explained at least in part by the realization that juror duties do *not* completely banish or exclude duties of partiality.

their personal goals and agent-relative moral concerns¹⁷ has a somewhat rigorist and inhumane ring to it.

Fifth, and related to the second point, it is even more obvious that the mother is entitled, perhaps even *required*, to be partial towards her own children if she has to ‘weigh in on the design of transnational institutional arrangements’. For example, suppose there is an international vote on three possible transnational arrangements for health care for children. The first two will save slightly more children than the third, but only the third will ensure that her own child will be saved. Obviously, from an ‘impartial’ point of view she should opt for one of the first two options. However, if a mother who is confronted with the alternative of either saving her own child from drowning or two others is allowed to save her own, then the mother in the current example, too, is certainly allowed to opt for saving her own child. The fact that in one situation she saves her child by swimming and in the other by voting hardly makes a difference.

I said above that Pogge adduces still ‘another way of restraining a cosmopolitan conception of ethics’¹⁸ and that this other way cannot justify the egalitarian component in Pogge’s social justice cosmopolitanism, that is, it cannot justify the reference to *equal* concern. Here is this other way:

One might hold, for instance, that all human agents have certain most stringent negative duties not to harm human beings in certain ways – not to violate their human rights, let us say – and that these negative duties are exceptional in two ways: first, they are exempt from the moral privilege otherwise enjoyed by human agents to show greater concern for the interests of the nearer and dearer. ... It is not acceptable, for example, to take greater drink-driving risks abroad on the ground that those one is endangering there are only foreigners. In seeking to avoid violating human rights, any agent must give exactly the same high weight to the human rights of every human being.¹⁹

First, Pogge is clearly wrong with this as far as situations of inevitable or *justified* rights violations are concerned, and nobody, apart from maybe a few extreme egalitarians, would upon further reflection subscribe to the position he is endorsing here. Consider this example: You are driving down a road. Through no fault of yours you are losing (full) control of the car. You will, whatever you do now, kill one of the two children playing on the street by running him or her over. One child is a stranger, the other your daughter. Do you really have to be impartial here? (Or consider a soldier who can stop the approaching *génocidaires* in a way that will kill one of two innocent children as a side-effect of his proportionate and necessary attack on the *génocidaires*. One child is a stranger, the other his son.) I must admit that I really do not think that you have to be impartial here. If, however, Pogge does think so, it seems the burden of proof is on him.

Second, in cases of avoidable and unjustified rights violations all the talk about ‘impartiality’ or ‘equality’ is mere rhetoric. If Arturo is in a situation where he cannot justifiably kill anybody and thus decides to kill neither his son nor the strange child, he is not respecting the two children’s rights ‘equally’ or ‘impartially’ – he is just respecting their rights, period.

Besides, Pogge’s invocation of *negative* duties would still not justify his claim, made again on the next page, that we owe distant strangers ‘just social institutions, whose design

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 325.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 328.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 328. ‘The second exceptional feature of these negative duties is their exclusionary force’, which has the effect of ‘completely banishing ... partialities from consideration’ (ibid., p. 329). He evokes the jury example again here. I already showed above that he is wrong with regard to this ‘exclusionary force’.

takes equal account of the interests of all human beings affected'.²⁰ This claim, after all, is *not* restricted to negative duties. Thus, he would again need something like the 'role responsibility for impartiality' argument already discussed above – which, however, we have seen to be wrong.

Thus, Pogge's 'social justice cosmopolitanism' is a non-starter, too.²¹

2. Why Pogge is neither a 'cosmopolitan' nor a cosmopolitan

Pogge's rejection of ethical cosmopolitanism must come as a surprise given his own definition of 'cosmopolitanism'. After all, in an almost canonized statement, he defines 'cosmopolitanism' as follows:

Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. First, *individualism*: the ultimate units of concern are *human beings*, or *persons* – rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or citizens. Second, *universality*: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to *every* living human being *equally* (cf. n. 90) – not merely to some subset, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, *generality*: this special status has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern *for everyone* – not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or suchlike.²²

In other words, 'cosmopolitanism', as defined by Pogge, says (and all these emphases come from the original) that *every person* 'is' *equally* a unit of concern for *each person* (it is safe to assume that the 'is' is to be read as an 'ought to be', since 'cosmopolitanism' is to be understood as a *normative* position). This, however, is, as already pointed out, absurd.

Pogge, to be sure, knows that it is, which might explain why he recommends in the above quote to 'cf. n. 90' (and, of course, develops his 'social justice cosmopolitanism'). That note informs us:

This second component is compatible with the view that the weight agents ought to give to the human rights of others varies with their relation to them – that agents have stronger moral reasons to secure human rights in their own country, for example, than abroad, so long as this is not seen as due to a difference in the moral significance of these rights, impersonally considered. (I can consistently believe that the flourishing of all children is equally important and that I should show greater concern for the flourishing of my own children than for that of other children.)²³

This statement is incorrect. The question is: equally important *for whom*? After all, as the terms 'importance' or 'important' are usually used, 'importance' designates a *relation*. Things cannot be important in themselves, but only *for* someone. Thus, when I think that I should show greater concern for my own children, they are obviously *more important for me* than other children. I *cannot* consistently think otherwise.

However, Pogge might simply have expressed himself badly and meant by importance something like 'moral worth'. Things and persons can have moral worth in themselves. And it would indeed be correct to say that one can consistently believe that all children have equal

²⁰ Ibid., p. 329.

²¹ I elsewhere argue that other attempts to save the doctrine of equal respect and concern also fail. See Uwe Steinhoff, 'Against Equal Respect and Concern, Equal Rights, and Egalitarian Impartiality', unpublished ms.

²² Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), p. 169.

²³ Ibid., p. 225.

worth *and* that one should show greater concern for one's own children than for other children. Yet, while this is true, it is also beside the point. The 'second component', after all, does not claim that all human beings have equal *worth*; rather, it claims that the status of ultimate *concern* attaches to every living human being equally. But concern is no more 'impersonal' than importance. For there to be concern, *somebody* has to be concerned. Thus, in conjunction with the first and the third component the second one has exactly the absurd implication Pogge (unsuccessfully) tries to block. And this means that 'cosmopolitanism', as defined by Pogge, is wrong (which should inconvenience quite a number of self-proclaimed 'cosmopolitans', who mostly accept Pogge's definition²⁴): it is simply not true that *everyone owes everyone equal respect and concern*.

The problem, thus, is that Pogge's definition of 'cosmopolitanism' is actually a definition of 'ethical cosmopolitanism', which is a creed Pogge explicitly rejects, as we saw. While he himself licenses partiality towards one's family and friends in the private domain, his definition of cosmopolitanism does not. The proviso Pogge added in a footnote simply contradicts the formulation of the definition. In other words, Pogge himself is not a cosmopolitan in the *literal* sense of his own definition.

To avoid confusions, then, Pogge should remedy this deficiency by providing a new definition that explicitly acknowledges the proviso. He could do this, for example, by reformulating the second component in the following way (perhaps even a reformulation of the third component is required, but I will leave this open here):

Second, *universality*: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to *every* living human being *equally*, but *only as far as the design and administration of legal and political institutions* is concerned. Otherwise partiality and *unequal* concern are perfectly acceptable.

Two further points are noteworthy about Pogge's definition of 'cosmopolitanism'. First, if one does not read Pogge's definition literally, but in such a way that it is compatible with the proviso, it becomes unclear what the big difference so often assumed between David Miller's liberal nationalism and Thomas Pogge's 'cosmopolitanism' is supposed to be. Of course, there might be *some* difference (and there is), but it would not appear to be a difference between a 'cosmopolitanism' compatible with Pogge's proviso on the one hand and some *non-*'cosmopolitanism' on the other. Miller, after all, does not say that one's fellow-citizens are worth more than other human beings (in fact, he denies that),²⁵ he only says that one should give priority to one's fellow citizens (as far as positive duties are concerned). This liberal nationalist position, however, is obviously entirely compatible with a version of Pogge's 'cosmopolitanism' that incorporates the proviso in a logically coherent way.²⁶

²⁴ Gillian Brock, *Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Approach* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 12, approvingly quotes Pogge's definition. The same elements mentioned by Pogge are explicit or implicit in the definition given by Kok-Chor Tan, *Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 1. He then concludes: 'In short, cosmopolitan justice is justice without borders.' It seems to me that you can have justice without borders without accepting the element of universality, if this is connected with an element of equality, as it is in Pogge's account. In any case, Pogge's definition is as far as I can see nearly unanimously accepted among self-proclaimed 'cosmopolitans'.

²⁵ See David Miller, *National Responsibility and Global Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), esp. pp. 27–28.

²⁶ Tan argues in *Justice Without Borders* that 'cosmopolitanism' is compatible with liberal nationalism, but he does not consider David Miller a liberal nationalist but a *communitarian* one (*ibid.*, p. 187). However, nothing of what Tan says undermines my point that Miller's position is entirely compatible with 'cosmopolitanism' as defined by Pogge (including the 'n. 90'), and Tan, after all, seems to accept Pogge's definition.

Second, the reason why I refer to Pogge's 'cosmopolitanism' in quotation marks is that I regard the term as a misnomer for his position. After all, cosmopolitanism is often and quite sensibly understood as the idea that state borders and national boundaries have no fundamental moral significance. I happen to be a cosmopolitan in this sense of the term, and thus define cosmopolitanism as follows (of course, my cosmopolitanism might be mistaken too, but that is not the present issue):

Cosmopolitanism is the view that state borders and national or ethnic boundaries have no fundamental moral significance, that is, it is the view that there are no ethnic groups, nations or states such that membership in them would confer any moral rights, duties, liberties or responsibilities on responsible adult persons, unless they are artificially made to do so. (An artificial way of doing so would be, for instance, for the mighty extraterrestrials to publicly and credibly threaten: 'Unless all state members on Earth will recite a poem tomorrow, we will destroy Earth.' This would confer a special duty on Earthlings to recite a poem in order to avoid the destruction of Earth, but in the same way a duty could be conferred on blonde cell phone owners, whether they are state members or not.)

Obviously, David Miller and John Rawls are not cosmopolitans in the sense of this definition, for they attribute a fundamental moral significance to national membership. *Nor*, however, is Thomas Pogge – and probably no other 'cosmopolitan' is either. Pogge, after all, clearly thinks that membership in at least democratic states is of enormous moral significance and does confer, in a non-artificial way, certain duties and responsibilities on the citizens of those states, duties and responsibilities which stateless individuals would not have. For example, he talks about 'the global institutional order for which our governments, *hence we*, bear primary responsibility'²⁷ and affirms that 'the conduct of our elected representatives' is '*our* conduct'.²⁸ Whether these assertions are correct or not,²⁹ clearly one cannot assert them and simultaneously claim that one does not attribute great moral significance to state borders, at least if we are talking about the borders of democratic states.

Thus, I conclude that Pogge's definition of cosmopolitanism is misleading, that cosmopolitanism as defined by Pogge (namely as defined as ethical cosmopolitanism) is wrong, that Pogge's social justice cosmopolitanism is as much a 'non-starter' as ethical cosmopolitanism, and that Pogge is neither a cosmopolitan in the sense of his own definition nor in the sense of a more reasonable definition that would define cosmopolitanism as a philosophical position involving the claim that state borders have no fundamental moral significance.³⁰

*Department of Politics and Public Administration
University of Hong Kong
Centennial Campus
Jockey Club Tower
Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong*

²⁷ Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights*, p. 13, my emphasis.

²⁸ Thomas Pogge, 'Making War on Terrorists—Reflections on Harming the Innocent', *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 16(1) (2008), pp. 1–25, at 22.

²⁹ In Uwe Steinhoff, 'Why "We" Are Not Harming the Global Poor: A Critique of Pogge's Leap from State to Individual Responsibility', *Public Reason* 4 (2012), pp. 119–138, I argue that they are not correct.

³⁰ I thank Allen Buchanan, Jiwei Ci, Jan-Christoph Heilinger, John Kekes, Jeremy Moss, Luciano Venezia, and Héctor Wittwer for helpful written comments on previous drafts of this paper.

ustnhoff@hku.hk