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Article: Learning to Game the System

TitleLearning to Game the System
Authors
Li, JMukherjee, AVasconcelos, L
Issue Date2020
PublisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/restud/
Citation
The Review of Economic Studies, 2020, Epub 2020-10-14 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa065
AbstractAn agent may privately learn which aspects of his job are more important by shirking on some of them, and use that information to shirk more effectively in the future. In a model of long-term employment relationship, we characterize the optimal relational contract in the presence of such learning-by-shirking, and highlight how the performance measurement system can be managed to sharpen incentives. Two related policies are studied: intermittent replacement of existing measures, and adoption of new ones. In spite of the learning-by-shirking effect, the optimal contract is stationary, and may involve stochastic replacement/adoption policies that dilute the agent’s information rents from learning how to game the system.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/290830
ISSN
0034-6527
2021 Impact Factor: 7.833
2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 15.641
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000710586200013

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLi, J-
dc.contributor.authorMukherjee, A-
dc.contributor.authorVasconcelos, L-
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-02T05:47:44Z-
dc.date.available2020-11-02T05:47:44Z-
dc.date.issued2020-
dc.identifier.citationThe Review of Economic Studies, 2020, Epub 2020-10-14-
dc.identifier.issn0034-6527-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/290830-
dc.description.abstractAn agent may privately learn which aspects of his job are more important by shirking on some of them, and use that information to shirk more effectively in the future. In a model of long-term employment relationship, we characterize the optimal relational contract in the presence of such learning-by-shirking, and highlight how the performance measurement system can be managed to sharpen incentives. Two related policies are studied: intermittent replacement of existing measures, and adoption of new ones. In spite of the learning-by-shirking effect, the optimal contract is stationary, and may involve stochastic replacement/adoption policies that dilute the agent’s information rents from learning how to game the system.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/restud/-
dc.relation.ispartofThe Review of Economic Studies-
dc.rightsPre-print: Journal Title] ©: [year] [owner as specified on the article] Published by Oxford University Press [on behalf of xxxxxx]. All rights reserved. Pre-print (Once an article is published, preprint notice should be amended to): This is an electronic version of an article published in [include the complete citation information for the final version of the Article as published in the print edition of the Journal.] Post-print: This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in [insert journal title] following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version [insert complete citation information here] is available online at: xxxxxxx [insert URL that the author will receive upon publication here].-
dc.titleLearning to Game the System-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailLi, J: jli1@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityLi, J=rp02406-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/restud/rdaa065-
dc.identifier.hkuros318188-
dc.identifier.volumeEpub 2020-10-14-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000710586200013-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdom-
dc.identifier.issnl0034-6527-

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