File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: When is upstream collusion profitable?

TitleWhen is upstream collusion profitable?
Authors
Issue Date2019
PublisherWiley, published in association with RAND. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.rje.org/archive.html
Citation
RAND Journal of Economics, 2019, v. 50 n. 2, p. 326-341 How to Cite?
AbstractMotivated by the recent antitrust cases in which Japanese auto parts suppliers colluded to raise supply prices against their long‐term collaborators, the Japanese carmakers, we study the conditions under which an upstream collusion is profitable even after compensating downstream direct purchasers. Oligopoly competition in successive industries is shown to give rise to a vertical externality and a horizontal externality. If a collusive price of intermediate goods better balances the two externalities, the collusion will raise the joint profit of all firms in the two industries and is therefore profitable for the upstream after compensation of downstream firms.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/272779
ISSN
2017 Impact Factor: 1.573
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.544

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGu, D-
dc.contributor.authorYao, Z-
dc.contributor.authorZhou, W-
dc.contributor.authorBai, R-
dc.date.accessioned2019-08-06T09:16:25Z-
dc.date.available2019-08-06T09:16:25Z-
dc.date.issued2019-
dc.identifier.citationRAND Journal of Economics, 2019, v. 50 n. 2, p. 326-341-
dc.identifier.issn0741-6261-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/272779-
dc.description.abstractMotivated by the recent antitrust cases in which Japanese auto parts suppliers colluded to raise supply prices against their long‐term collaborators, the Japanese carmakers, we study the conditions under which an upstream collusion is profitable even after compensating downstream direct purchasers. Oligopoly competition in successive industries is shown to give rise to a vertical externality and a horizontal externality. If a collusive price of intermediate goods better balances the two externalities, the collusion will raise the joint profit of all firms in the two industries and is therefore profitable for the upstream after compensation of downstream firms.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherWiley, published in association with RAND. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.rje.org/archive.html-
dc.relation.ispartofRAND Journal of Economics-
dc.titleWhen is upstream collusion profitable?-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailZhou, W: wzhou@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityZhou, W=rp01128-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1756-2171.12271-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85063667831-
dc.identifier.hkuros300041-
dc.identifier.volume50-
dc.identifier.issue2-
dc.identifier.spage326-
dc.identifier.epage341-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats