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Article: Ceo turnover, financial distress, and contractual innovations

TitleCeo turnover, financial distress, and contractual innovations
Authors
KeywordsChapter 11
Corporate governance
Debtor in Possession (DIP) financing
Incentive contracts
Key Employee Retention Plans (KERPs)
CEO turnover
Bankruptcy
Issue Date2014
Citation
Accounting Review, 2014, v. 89, n. 3, p. 959-990 How to Cite?
AbstractThe design of CEO incentives is particularly important for firms in financial distress. We compare the resolution of CEO incentive problems in distressed firms between the 1980s versus the 1990s, focusing on how changes in contractual provisions, as well as in the executive labor market, resulted in a shift to a new equilibrium. Our analyses provide evidence that the increased bargaining power of creditors, together with changes in the use of contractual provisions in the 1990s, enabled creditors to more effectively retain highly skilled CEOs with firm-specific knowledge and provide them with incentives to improve firm performance.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/256667
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.953
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 4.478

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorEvans, John Harry-
dc.contributor.authorLuo, Shuqing-
dc.contributor.authorNagarajan, Nandu J.-
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-24T08:57:33Z-
dc.date.available2018-07-24T08:57:33Z-
dc.date.issued2014-
dc.identifier.citationAccounting Review, 2014, v. 89, n. 3, p. 959-990-
dc.identifier.issn0001-4826-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/256667-
dc.description.abstractThe design of CEO incentives is particularly important for firms in financial distress. We compare the resolution of CEO incentive problems in distressed firms between the 1980s versus the 1990s, focusing on how changes in contractual provisions, as well as in the executive labor market, resulted in a shift to a new equilibrium. Our analyses provide evidence that the increased bargaining power of creditors, together with changes in the use of contractual provisions in the 1990s, enabled creditors to more effectively retain highly skilled CEOs with firm-specific knowledge and provide them with incentives to improve firm performance.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofAccounting Review-
dc.subjectChapter 11-
dc.subjectCorporate governance-
dc.subjectDebtor in Possession (DIP) financing-
dc.subjectIncentive contracts-
dc.subjectKey Employee Retention Plans (KERPs)-
dc.subjectCEO turnover-
dc.subjectBankruptcy-
dc.titleCeo turnover, financial distress, and contractual innovations-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.natureLink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.2308/accr-50688-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84903118831-
dc.identifier.volume89-
dc.identifier.issue3-
dc.identifier.spage959-
dc.identifier.epage990-

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