File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: Demythologizing intuition

TitleDemythologizing intuition
Authors
Keywordsepistemology
philosophical methodology
metaphilosophy
Intuition
Issue Date2017
Citation
Inquiry (United Kingdom), 2017, v. 60, n. 4, p. 386-402 How to Cite?
Abstract© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Max Deutsch’s new book argues against the commonly held ‘myth’ that philosophical methodology characteristically employs intuitions as evidence. While I am sympathetic to the general claim that philosophical methodology has been grossly oversimplified in the intuition literature, the particular claim that it is a myth that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence is open to several very different interpretations. The plausibility and consequences of a rejection of the ‘myth’ will depend on the notion of evidence one employs, the notion of intuition one holds, and how one understands the idea of ‘relying on’ or ‘employing’ something as evidence. I describe what I take to be the version of The Myth which is most plausibly undermined by Deutsch’s arguments; however, I also argue that the falsity of this myth has only minimal consequences for the viability of the experimental philosophy research project.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/244278
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.079
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.550

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorNado, Jennifer-
dc.date.accessioned2017-08-31T08:56:32Z-
dc.date.available2017-08-31T08:56:32Z-
dc.date.issued2017-
dc.identifier.citationInquiry (United Kingdom), 2017, v. 60, n. 4, p. 386-402-
dc.identifier.issn0020-174X-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/244278-
dc.description.abstract© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Max Deutsch’s new book argues against the commonly held ‘myth’ that philosophical methodology characteristically employs intuitions as evidence. While I am sympathetic to the general claim that philosophical methodology has been grossly oversimplified in the intuition literature, the particular claim that it is a myth that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence is open to several very different interpretations. The plausibility and consequences of a rejection of the ‘myth’ will depend on the notion of evidence one employs, the notion of intuition one holds, and how one understands the idea of ‘relying on’ or ‘employing’ something as evidence. I describe what I take to be the version of The Myth which is most plausibly undermined by Deutsch’s arguments; however, I also argue that the falsity of this myth has only minimal consequences for the viability of the experimental philosophy research project.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofInquiry (United Kingdom)-
dc.subjectepistemology-
dc.subjectphilosophical methodology-
dc.subjectmetaphilosophy-
dc.subjectIntuition-
dc.titleDemythologizing intuition-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.natureLink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/0020174X.2016.1220639-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84986238355-
dc.identifier.volume60-
dc.identifier.issue4-
dc.identifier.spage386-
dc.identifier.epage402-
dc.identifier.eissn1502-3923-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats