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- Publisher Website: 10.1080/00048402.2016.1273959
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85009495790
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Article: Knowledge Is Not Enough
Title | Knowledge Is Not Enough |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | experimental philosophy intuition metaphilosophy |
Issue Date | 2017 |
Citation | Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2017, v. 95 n. 4, p. 658-672 How to Cite? |
Abstract | © 2017 Australasian Association of Philosophy Discussions of the role of intuition in philosophical methodology typically proceed within the knowledge-centred framework of mainstream analytic epistemology. Either implicitly or explicitly, the primary questions in metaphilosophy frequently seem to revolve around whether or not intuition is a source of justification, evidence, or knowledge. I argue that this Standard Framework is inappropriate for methodological purposes: the epistemic standards that govern inquiry in philosophy are more stringent than the standards that govern everyday cognition. The experimentalist should instead view her criticisms as analogous to calls for the use of double-blinding in science. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/244065 |
ISSN | 2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.703 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Nado, Jennifer | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-08-31T08:55:57Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-08-31T08:55:57Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2017, v. 95 n. 4, p. 658-672 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0004-8402 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/244065 | - |
dc.description.abstract | © 2017 Australasian Association of Philosophy Discussions of the role of intuition in philosophical methodology typically proceed within the knowledge-centred framework of mainstream analytic epistemology. Either implicitly or explicitly, the primary questions in metaphilosophy frequently seem to revolve around whether or not intuition is a source of justification, evidence, or knowledge. I argue that this Standard Framework is inappropriate for methodological purposes: the epistemic standards that govern inquiry in philosophy are more stringent than the standards that govern everyday cognition. The experimentalist should instead view her criticisms as analogous to calls for the use of double-blinding in science. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Australasian Journal of Philosophy | - |
dc.subject | experimental philosophy | - |
dc.subject | intuition | - |
dc.subject | metaphilosophy | - |
dc.title | Knowledge Is Not Enough | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/00048402.2016.1273959 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85009495790 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 287131 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 95 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 658 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 672 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000411515000003 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0004-8402 | - |