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- Publisher Website: 10.1002/tht3.206
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-84994644503
- WOS: WOS:000388421400001
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Article: Experimental Philosophy 2.0
Title | Experimental Philosophy 2.0 |
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Authors | |
Keywords | methodology centrality experimental philosophy intuition metaphilosophy |
Issue Date | 2016 |
Citation | Thought, 2016, v. 5, n. 3, p. 159-168 How to Cite? |
Abstract | © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc and the Northern Institute of Philosophy I recommend three revisions to experimental philosophy's âself-imageâ which I suggest will enable experimentalist critics of intuition to evade several important objections to the 'negative' strand of the experimental philosophy research project. First, experimentalists should avoid broad criticisms of âintuitionâ as a whole, instead drawing a variety of conclusions about a variety of much narrower categories of mental state. Second, experimentalists should state said conclusions in terms of epistemic norms particular to philosophical inquiry, rather than attempting to, for example, deny that intuitions produce justified belief. Third, experimentalists should acknowledge the limitations of the âmethod of casesâ model of philosophical inquiry, and expand their experimental work accordingly. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/244059 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Nado, Jennifer | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-08-31T08:55:56Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-08-31T08:55:56Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Thought, 2016, v. 5, n. 3, p. 159-168 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/244059 | - |
dc.description.abstract | © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc and the Northern Institute of Philosophy I recommend three revisions to experimental philosophy's âself-imageâ which I suggest will enable experimentalist critics of intuition to evade several important objections to the 'negative' strand of the experimental philosophy research project. First, experimentalists should avoid broad criticisms of âintuitionâ as a whole, instead drawing a variety of conclusions about a variety of much narrower categories of mental state. Second, experimentalists should state said conclusions in terms of epistemic norms particular to philosophical inquiry, rather than attempting to, for example, deny that intuitions produce justified belief. Third, experimentalists should acknowledge the limitations of the âmethod of casesâ model of philosophical inquiry, and expand their experimental work accordingly. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Thought | - |
dc.subject | methodology | - |
dc.subject | centrality | - |
dc.subject | experimental philosophy | - |
dc.subject | intuition | - |
dc.subject | metaphilosophy | - |
dc.title | Experimental Philosophy 2.0 | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1002/tht3.206 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84994644503 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 5 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 3 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 159 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 168 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 2161-2234 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000388421400001 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 2161-2234 | - |