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Article: China's land market auctions: Evidence of corruption?

TitleChina's land market auctions: Evidence of corruption?
Authors
Issue Date2013
Citation
RAND Journal of Economics, 2013, v. 44, n. 3, p. 488-521 How to Cite?
AbstractIn China, urban land is allocated by leasehold sales by local officials. Attempting to end widespread corruption, the government now requires sales to be conducted publicly, by either English or "two-stage" auctions. However, corruption persists through the choice of auction format and preauction side deals between favored bidders and local officials. Two-stage auctions have a first stage where favored developers signal that auctions are "taken," deterring entry of other bidders. Empirics show that both sales prices and competition are significantly less for two-stage than English auctions. Selection on unobserved property characteristics is positive: officials divert hotter properties to two-stage auctions. © 2013, RAND.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/241901
ISSN
2017 Impact Factor: 1.573
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.544
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorCai, Hongbin-
dc.contributor.authorHenderson, J. Vernon-
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Qinghua-
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-23T01:56:04Z-
dc.date.available2017-06-23T01:56:04Z-
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.identifier.citationRAND Journal of Economics, 2013, v. 44, n. 3, p. 488-521-
dc.identifier.issn0741-6261-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/241901-
dc.description.abstractIn China, urban land is allocated by leasehold sales by local officials. Attempting to end widespread corruption, the government now requires sales to be conducted publicly, by either English or "two-stage" auctions. However, corruption persists through the choice of auction format and preauction side deals between favored bidders and local officials. Two-stage auctions have a first stage where favored developers signal that auctions are "taken," deterring entry of other bidders. Empirics show that both sales prices and competition are significantly less for two-stage than English auctions. Selection on unobserved property characteristics is positive: officials divert hotter properties to two-stage auctions. © 2013, RAND.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofRAND Journal of Economics-
dc.titleChina's land market auctions: Evidence of corruption?-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.natureLink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1756-2171.12028-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84889691175-
dc.identifier.volume44-
dc.identifier.issue3-
dc.identifier.spage488-
dc.identifier.epage521-
dc.identifier.eissn1756-2171-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000328218700005-

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