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Article: Political decentralization and policy experimentation

TitlePolitical decentralization and policy experimentation
Authors
KeywordsDecentralization
Innovation
Policy experiments
Voting
Information
Issue Date2009
Citation
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2009, v. 4, n. 1, p. 35-58 How to Cite?
AbstractSince 1932, when Justice Louis Brandeis remarked that in a federal system states can serve as "laboratories" of democracy, political decentralization has been thought to stimulate policy experimentation. We reexamine the political economy behind this belief, using a simple model of voting in centralized and decentralized democracies. We find that the electoral logic suggests the opposite conclusion: centralization usually leads to "too much" policy experimentation, compared to the social optimum, while decentralization leads to "too little." Three effects of centralization - an "informational externality," a "risk-seeking" effect, and a "risk-conserving" effect - account for the different outcomes. © 2009 H. Cai and D. Treisman.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/241893
ISSN
2017 Impact Factor: 2.133
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.401
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorCai, Hongbin-
dc.contributor.authorTreisman, Daniel-
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-23T01:56:02Z-
dc.date.available2017-06-23T01:56:02Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.citationQuarterly Journal of Political Science, 2009, v. 4, n. 1, p. 35-58-
dc.identifier.issn1554-0626-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/241893-
dc.description.abstractSince 1932, when Justice Louis Brandeis remarked that in a federal system states can serve as "laboratories" of democracy, political decentralization has been thought to stimulate policy experimentation. We reexamine the political economy behind this belief, using a simple model of voting in centralized and decentralized democracies. We find that the electoral logic suggests the opposite conclusion: centralization usually leads to "too much" policy experimentation, compared to the social optimum, while decentralization leads to "too little." Three effects of centralization - an "informational externality," a "risk-seeking" effect, and a "risk-conserving" effect - account for the different outcomes. © 2009 H. Cai and D. Treisman.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofQuarterly Journal of Political Science-
dc.subjectDecentralization-
dc.subjectInnovation-
dc.subjectPolicy experiments-
dc.subjectVoting-
dc.subjectInformation-
dc.titlePolitical decentralization and policy experimentation-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.natureLink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1561/100.00008039-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-67651061737-
dc.identifier.volume4-
dc.identifier.issue1-
dc.identifier.spage35-
dc.identifier.epage58-
dc.identifier.eissn1554-0634-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000270725000002-

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