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Article: Reserve price signaling

TitleReserve price signaling
Authors
KeywordsSignaling
Reserve price
Auctions
Issue Date2007
Citation
Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, v. 135, n. 1, p. 253-268 How to Cite?
AbstractIn a general auction model in which bidders' signals are affiliated, we characterize the unique separating equilibrium in which the seller can use reserve prices to credibly signal her private information. When the buyers' signals are independent, the optimal reserve price is shown to be increasing in the number of bidders under certain conditions. We also demonstrate that the probability that the item is sold at the reserve price can increase as the number of bidders increases, which indicates a more central role for reserve prices than perceived in the standard auction models. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/241890
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.097
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.587

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorCai, Hongbin-
dc.contributor.authorRiley, John-
dc.contributor.authorYe, Lixin-
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-23T01:56:01Z-
dc.date.available2017-06-23T01:56:01Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Theory, 2007, v. 135, n. 1, p. 253-268-
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/241890-
dc.description.abstractIn a general auction model in which bidders' signals are affiliated, we characterize the unique separating equilibrium in which the seller can use reserve prices to credibly signal her private information. When the buyers' signals are independent, the optimal reserve price is shown to be increasing in the number of bidders under certain conditions. We also demonstrate that the probability that the item is sold at the reserve price can increase as the number of bidders increases, which indicates a more central role for reserve prices than perceived in the standard auction models. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Economic Theory-
dc.subjectSignaling-
dc.subjectReserve price-
dc.subjectAuctions-
dc.titleReserve price signaling-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.natureLink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.005-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-34250682281-
dc.identifier.volume135-
dc.identifier.issue1-
dc.identifier.spage253-
dc.identifier.epage268-
dc.identifier.eissn1095-7235-

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