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Article: A theory of joint asset ownership

TitleA theory of joint asset ownership
Authors
Issue Date2003
Citation
RAND Journal of Economics, 2003, v. 34, n. 1, p. 63-77 How to Cite?
AbstractI offer a theory of joint ownership by extending the standard property right theory of the firm to situations where parties can endogenously choose the degree of specificity of their investments (i.e., both the type of investment - specific and general - and the level of each). When specific and general investments are complements, the standard GHM results are obtained and joint ownership is suboptimal. When specific and general investments are substitutes, joint ownership is optimal as long as trade takes place within the relationship. Joint ownership provides stronger incentives to make specific investments than any other forms of ownership by discouraging general investments.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/241883
ISSN
2017 Impact Factor: 1.573
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.544

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorCai, Hongbin-
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-23T01:56:00Z-
dc.date.available2017-06-23T01:56:00Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.citationRAND Journal of Economics, 2003, v. 34, n. 1, p. 63-77-
dc.identifier.issn0741-6261-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/241883-
dc.description.abstractI offer a theory of joint ownership by extending the standard property right theory of the firm to situations where parties can endogenously choose the degree of specificity of their investments (i.e., both the type of investment - specific and general - and the level of each). When specific and general investments are complements, the standard GHM results are obtained and joint ownership is suboptimal. When specific and general investments are substitutes, joint ownership is optimal as long as trade takes place within the relationship. Joint ownership provides stronger incentives to make specific investments than any other forms of ownership by discouraging general investments.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofRAND Journal of Economics-
dc.titleA theory of joint asset ownership-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.natureLink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0037362272-
dc.identifier.volume34-
dc.identifier.issue1-
dc.identifier.spage63-
dc.identifier.epage77-

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