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Article: Doctrinal Antithesis in Anglo-American Administrative Law

TitleDoctrinal Antithesis in Anglo-American Administrative Law
Authors
Issue Date2014
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/SCER/home.html
Citation
Supreme Court Economic Review, 2014, v. 22, p. 147-180 How to Cite?
AbstractEnglish administrative law guards judicial supremacy over all matters of statutory interpretation, while instructing judges to refrain from scrutinizing administrators’ factual findings. By contrast, American federal courts are obliged to respect agencies’ statutory-interpretive autonomy, but take a rigorous “hard look” at substantial agency factual determinations. This Article argues that the antithetical approaches to judicial review of administrative action adopted by the apex courts of the United Kingdom and the United States can be adequately explained by the polarization of these two polities along a spectrum of effective vetogates.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/233892
ISSN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorIp, Eric C.-
dc.date.accessioned2016-09-29T03:15:46Z-
dc.date.available2016-09-29T03:15:46Z-
dc.date.issued2014-
dc.identifier.citationSupreme Court Economic Review, 2014, v. 22, p. 147-180-
dc.identifier.issn0736-9921-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/233892-
dc.description.abstractEnglish administrative law guards judicial supremacy over all matters of statutory interpretation, while instructing judges to refrain from scrutinizing administrators’ factual findings. By contrast, American federal courts are obliged to respect agencies’ statutory-interpretive autonomy, but take a rigorous “hard look” at substantial agency factual determinations. This Article argues that the antithetical approaches to judicial review of administrative action adopted by the apex courts of the United Kingdom and the United States can be adequately explained by the polarization of these two polities along a spectrum of effective vetogates.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/SCER/home.html-
dc.relation.ispartofSupreme Court Economic Review-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleDoctrinal Antithesis in Anglo-American Administrative Law-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailIp, Eric C.: ericcip@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityIp, Eric C.=rp02161-
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/682017-
dc.identifier.hkuros268043-
dc.identifier.volume22-
dc.identifier.spage147-
dc.identifier.epage180-

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