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Article: A Positive Theory of Constitutional Judicial Review: Evidence from Singapore and Taiwan

TitleA Positive Theory of Constitutional Judicial Review: Evidence from Singapore and Taiwan
Authors
Keywordsconstitutional judicial review
expressive public choice
trust and reciprocity
political transaction costs
Singapore
Taiwan
Issue Date2011
PublisherDE GRUYTER
Citation
Asian Journal of Law and Economics, 2011, v. 2 n. 4, p. 1-43 How to Cite?
AbstractThe consensus over independent constitutional judicial review - that it inevitably stems from electoral and inter-branch competition - has been weakened by recent empirical discoveries; however, empiricists have yet to offer a coherent explanation why non-competitive, authoritarian, governments would tolerate constitutional courts that strike down their legislation. This article proposes a “Constitutional Investment Theory” that solves this puzzle: expressive symbolism is central to these regimes’ calculus for acquiescing in the activation of judicial review; the variable perdurability of judicial review depends on how much trust the regime invest in the judiciary; and activism in judicial review is the likelier to emerge the higher the transaction costs of retaliating against offending courts. Evidence from Singapore and pre-2000 Taiwan lends support to this theory.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/233886
ISSN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorIp, Eric C.-
dc.date.accessioned2016-09-29T03:15:45Z-
dc.date.available2016-09-29T03:15:45Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.citationAsian Journal of Law and Economics, 2011, v. 2 n. 4, p. 1-43-
dc.identifier.issn2154-4611-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/233886-
dc.description.abstractThe consensus over independent constitutional judicial review - that it inevitably stems from electoral and inter-branch competition - has been weakened by recent empirical discoveries; however, empiricists have yet to offer a coherent explanation why non-competitive, authoritarian, governments would tolerate constitutional courts that strike down their legislation. This article proposes a “Constitutional Investment Theory” that solves this puzzle: expressive symbolism is central to these regimes’ calculus for acquiescing in the activation of judicial review; the variable perdurability of judicial review depends on how much trust the regime invest in the judiciary; and activism in judicial review is the likelier to emerge the higher the transaction costs of retaliating against offending courts. Evidence from Singapore and pre-2000 Taiwan lends support to this theory.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherDE GRUYTER-
dc.relation.ispartofAsian Journal of Law and Economics-
dc.subjectconstitutional judicial review-
dc.subjectexpressive public choice-
dc.subjecttrust and reciprocity-
dc.subjectpolitical transaction costs-
dc.subjectSingapore-
dc.subjectTaiwan-
dc.titleA Positive Theory of Constitutional Judicial Review: Evidence from Singapore and Taiwan-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailIp, Eric C.: ericcip@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityIp, Eric C.=rp02161-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1515/2154-4611.1050-
dc.identifier.volume2-
dc.identifier.issue4-
dc.identifier.spage1-
dc.identifier.epage43-

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