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Conference Paper: An efficient auction mechanism for service chains in the NFV market

TitleAn efficient auction mechanism for service chains in the NFV market
Authors
Issue Date2016
PublisherIEEE Computer Society. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1000359
Citation
The 35th Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (IEEE INFOCOM 2016), San Francisco, CA., 10-14 April 2016. In IEEE Infocom Proceedings, 2016, p. 1-9 How to Cite?
AbstractNetwork Function Virtualization (NFV) is emerging as a new paradigm for providing elastic network functions through flexible virtual network function (VNF) instances executed on virtualized computing platforms exemplified by cloud datacenters. In the new NFV market, well defined VNF instances each realize an atomic function that can be chained to meet user demands in practice. This work studies the dynamic market mechanism design for the transaction of VNF service chains in the NFV market, to help relinquish the full power of NFV. Combining the techniques of primal-dual approximation algorithm design with Myerson's characterization of truthful mechanisms, we design a VNF chain auction that runs efficiently in polynomial time, guarantees truthfulness, and achieves near-optimal social welfare in the NFV eco-system. Extensive simulation studies verify the efficacy of our auction mechanism. © 2016 IEEE.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/229713
ISBN
ISSN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGu, S-
dc.contributor.authorLi, Z-
dc.contributor.authorWu, C-
dc.contributor.authorHuang, C-
dc.date.accessioned2016-08-23T14:12:50Z-
dc.date.available2016-08-23T14:12:50Z-
dc.date.issued2016-
dc.identifier.citationThe 35th Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (IEEE INFOCOM 2016), San Francisco, CA., 10-14 April 2016. In IEEE Infocom Proceedings, 2016, p. 1-9-
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-4673-9953-1-
dc.identifier.issn0743-166X-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/229713-
dc.description.abstractNetwork Function Virtualization (NFV) is emerging as a new paradigm for providing elastic network functions through flexible virtual network function (VNF) instances executed on virtualized computing platforms exemplified by cloud datacenters. In the new NFV market, well defined VNF instances each realize an atomic function that can be chained to meet user demands in practice. This work studies the dynamic market mechanism design for the transaction of VNF service chains in the NFV market, to help relinquish the full power of NFV. Combining the techniques of primal-dual approximation algorithm design with Myerson's characterization of truthful mechanisms, we design a VNF chain auction that runs efficiently in polynomial time, guarantees truthfulness, and achieves near-optimal social welfare in the NFV eco-system. Extensive simulation studies verify the efficacy of our auction mechanism. © 2016 IEEE.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherIEEE Computer Society. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1000359-
dc.relation.ispartofIEEE Infocom Proceedings-
dc.rightsIEEE Infocom Proceedings. Copyright © IEEE Computer Society.-
dc.rights©2016 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleAn efficient auction mechanism for service chains in the NFV market-
dc.typeConference_Paper-
dc.identifier.emailWu, C: cwu@cs.hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityWu, C=rp01397-
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/INFOCOM.2016.7524438-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84983353082-
dc.identifier.hkuros261737-
dc.identifier.spage1-
dc.identifier.epage9-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-
dc.customcontrol.immutablesml 160908-

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