File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: A Strategic Concession Game

TitleA Strategic Concession Game
Authors
Issue Date1999
PublisherWorld Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.worldscinet.com/igtr/igtr.shtml
Citation
International Game Theory Review, 1999, v. 1 n. 1, p. 103-129 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper considers a two-player negotiation problem with complete information and non-transferable payoffs/utilities. There are gains to be made by both players if they make bilateral concessions in their actions, relative to the status quo Nash equilibrium (NE) outcome. The failure to agree on a jointly acceptable arrangement has been a major stumbling block to the exploitation of such gains. The paper develops a concession game which has a cooperative trait in the sense that bilateral concessions in actions are sought by both players, but the game proceeds in a non-cooperative fashion in determining the levels of concessions, given a prior agreement over the rules of the game among the players. The game is applicable to a large class of bargaining situations in which both players would benefit from mutual reductions in their decision variables. Two specific applications, a tariff negotiation game and a cartel output agreement are examined.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/225110
ISSN
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.384

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorJØFrgensen, S-
dc.contributor.authorYeung, DWK-
dc.date.accessioned2016-04-21T08:01:40Z-
dc.date.available2016-04-21T08:01:40Z-
dc.date.issued1999-
dc.identifier.citationInternational Game Theory Review, 1999, v. 1 n. 1, p. 103-129-
dc.identifier.issn0219-1989-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/225110-
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers a two-player negotiation problem with complete information and non-transferable payoffs/utilities. There are gains to be made by both players if they make bilateral concessions in their actions, relative to the status quo Nash equilibrium (NE) outcome. The failure to agree on a jointly acceptable arrangement has been a major stumbling block to the exploitation of such gains. The paper develops a concession game which has a cooperative trait in the sense that bilateral concessions in actions are sought by both players, but the game proceeds in a non-cooperative fashion in determining the levels of concessions, given a prior agreement over the rules of the game among the players. The game is applicable to a large class of bargaining situations in which both players would benefit from mutual reductions in their decision variables. Two specific applications, a tariff negotiation game and a cartel output agreement are examined.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherWorld Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.worldscinet.com/igtr/igtr.shtml-
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Game Theory Review-
dc.rightsFor preprints : Preprint of an article published in [Journal, Volume, Issue, Year, Pages] [Article DOI] © [copyright World Scientific Publishing Company] [Journal URL] For postprints : Electronic version of an article published as [Journal, Volume, Issue, Year, Pages] [Article DOI] © [copyright World Scientific Publishing Company] [Journal URL] -
dc.titleA Strategic Concession Game-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailYeung, DWK: dwkyeung@econ.hku.hk-
dc.identifier.doi10.1142/S0219198999000086-
dc.identifier.hkuros43980-
dc.identifier.volume1-
dc.identifier.issue1-
dc.identifier.spage103-
dc.identifier.epage129-
dc.publisher.placeSingapore-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats