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Article: Principal-agent Theory Based Risk Allocation Model for Virtual Enterprise

TitlePrincipal-agent Theory Based Risk Allocation Model for Virtual Enterprise
Authors
KeywordsVirtual Enterprise
Risk Allocation
Principal-Agent Theory
Risk Aversion
Common Agency
Issue Date2010
PublisherScientific Research Publishing, Inc. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.scirp.org/journal/jssm/
Citation
Journal of Service Science and Management, 2010, v. 3 n. 2, p. 241-249 How to Cite?
AbstractIn this paper, we consider a risk analysis model for Virtual Enterprise (VE) by exploring the state of the art of the principal-agent theory. In particular, we deal with the problem of allocating the cost of risk between two parties in a VE, namely, the owner and the partner(s). We first consider the case of a single partner of VE with symmetric information or asymmetric information and then the case of multiple partners. We also build a model for the optimal contract of the risk allocation based on the principal-agent theory and analyze it through specific example. At last we consider the case of multiple principal with potentially many partners based on common agency.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/224725
ISSN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHuang, M-
dc.contributor.authorChen, K-
dc.contributor.authorChing, WK-
dc.contributor.authorSiu, KTK-
dc.date.accessioned2016-04-13T06:13:58Z-
dc.date.available2016-04-13T06:13:58Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Service Science and Management, 2010, v. 3 n. 2, p. 241-249-
dc.identifier.issn1940-9893-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/224725-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we consider a risk analysis model for Virtual Enterprise (VE) by exploring the state of the art of the principal-agent theory. In particular, we deal with the problem of allocating the cost of risk between two parties in a VE, namely, the owner and the partner(s). We first consider the case of a single partner of VE with symmetric information or asymmetric information and then the case of multiple partners. We also build a model for the optimal contract of the risk allocation based on the principal-agent theory and analyze it through specific example. At last we consider the case of multiple principal with potentially many partners based on common agency.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherScientific Research Publishing, Inc. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.scirp.org/journal/jssm/-
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Service Science and Management-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.subjectVirtual Enterprise-
dc.subjectRisk Allocation-
dc.subjectPrincipal-Agent Theory-
dc.subjectRisk Aversion-
dc.subjectCommon Agency-
dc.titlePrincipal-agent Theory Based Risk Allocation Model for Virtual Enterprise-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailChen, K: guikechen@sina.com.cn-
dc.identifier.emailChing, WK: wching@HKUCC.hku.hk-
dc.identifier.emailSiu, KTK: tksiu@graduate.hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityChing, WK=rp00679-
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.doi10.4236/jssm.2010.32029-
dc.identifier.hkuros180487-
dc.identifier.volume3-
dc.identifier.issue2-
dc.identifier.spage241-
dc.identifier.epage249-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-

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