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Conference Paper: Strategy-proof mechanism for obnoxious facility location on a line

TitleStrategy-proof mechanism for obnoxious facility location on a line
Authors
Issue Date2015
PublisherSpringer Verlag. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.com/content/105633/
Citation
The 21st Annual International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON 2015), Beijing, China, 4-6 August 2015. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2015, v. 9198, p. 45-56 How to Cite?
AbstractIn the problem of obnoxious facility location, an obnoxious facility is located in an area. To maximize the social welfare, e.g., the sum of distances from all the agents to the facility, we have to get the true locations of each agent. However, each agent may misreport his/her location to stay far away from the obnoxious facility. In this paper, we design strategy-proof mechanisms on locating an obnoxious facility on a real line. Two objective functions, i.e., maximizing the sum of squares of distances (maxSOS) and maximizing the sum of distances (maxSum), have been considered. For maxSOS, a randomized strategy-proof mechanism with approximation ratio 5 / 3 is given, meanwhile the lower bound is proved to be at least 1.042. The lower bound of any randomized strategy-proof mechanisms w.r.t. maxSum is proved to be 1.077. Moreover, an extended model that each agent controls multiple locations is considered. For this model, we investigate deterministic and randomized strategy-proof mechanisms w.r.t. maxSum and maxSOS objectives, respectively. The deterministic mechanisms are shown to be tight for both objectives.
DescriptionLNCS v. 9198 entitled: Computing and Combinatorics: 21st International Conference, COCOON 2015, Beijing, China, August 4-6, 2015, Proceedings
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/219224
ISBN
ISSN
2005 Impact Factor: 0.402
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.252

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorYe, D-
dc.contributor.authorMei, L-
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Y-
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-18T07:18:11Z-
dc.date.available2015-09-18T07:18:11Z-
dc.date.issued2015-
dc.identifier.citationThe 21st Annual International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON 2015), Beijing, China, 4-6 August 2015. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2015, v. 9198, p. 45-56-
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-319-21397-2-
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/219224-
dc.descriptionLNCS v. 9198 entitled: Computing and Combinatorics: 21st International Conference, COCOON 2015, Beijing, China, August 4-6, 2015, Proceedings-
dc.description.abstractIn the problem of obnoxious facility location, an obnoxious facility is located in an area. To maximize the social welfare, e.g., the sum of distances from all the agents to the facility, we have to get the true locations of each agent. However, each agent may misreport his/her location to stay far away from the obnoxious facility. In this paper, we design strategy-proof mechanisms on locating an obnoxious facility on a real line. Two objective functions, i.e., maximizing the sum of squares of distances (maxSOS) and maximizing the sum of distances (maxSum), have been considered. For maxSOS, a randomized strategy-proof mechanism with approximation ratio 5 / 3 is given, meanwhile the lower bound is proved to be at least 1.042. The lower bound of any randomized strategy-proof mechanisms w.r.t. maxSum is proved to be 1.077. Moreover, an extended model that each agent controls multiple locations is considered. For this model, we investigate deterministic and randomized strategy-proof mechanisms w.r.t. maxSum and maxSOS objectives, respectively. The deterministic mechanisms are shown to be tight for both objectives.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.com/content/105633/-
dc.relation.ispartofLecture Notes in Computer Science-
dc.rightsThe final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21398-9_4-
dc.titleStrategy-proof mechanism for obnoxious facility location on a line-
dc.typeConference_Paper-
dc.identifier.emailZhang, Y: yongzh@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-319-21398-9_4-
dc.identifier.hkuros253617-
dc.identifier.volume9198-
dc.identifier.spage45-
dc.identifier.epage56-
dc.publisher.placeGermany-
dc.customcontrol.immutablesml 151222-

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