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postgraduate thesis: The real effects of CEO compensation : evidence from equity and bonus incentive plans

TitleThe real effects of CEO compensation : evidence from equity and bonus incentive plans
Authors
Issue Date2014
PublisherThe University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong)
Citation
Luo, J. [羅婧]. (2014). The real effects of CEO compensation : evidence from equity and bonus incentive plans. (Thesis). University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong SAR. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b5558962
AbstractThis thesis consists of two essays exploring the effects of executive compensation contracts on the real economy. Evidence from equity incentive schemes and annual bonus plans are provided separately in the two essays. The first essay examines the relation between CEO option compensation and bank risk-taking, and the role of CEO option compensation in affecting bank performance during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Through panel regressions, I find that over the sample period (1993-2011), option awards received by bank CEO and CEO option holdings lead to higher bank risk which is not rewarded by better performance. Bank CEOs take more risk by engaging more in financial innovation and maintaining more risky loan portfolios. Institutional investors favor high option compensation in their own interests of pursuing short-term stock price upswing, while a larger board corrects this excessive risk-taking by providing bank CEOs with less option compensation. Cross-sectional evidence shows that during the crisis period, the effect of option compensation in increasing risk-taking and worsening performance comes from exercisable option holdings. In addition to the findings regarding option compensation, stock awards are shown to affect bank risk and performance, while stock holdings play no role. In the second essay, using a hand collected sample of 1491 firm-years spanning 2006-2011, for which I have been able to gather from annual incentive schemes performance measures and two levels of corresponding targets which represent board directors’ performance expectations on chief executive officers (CEOs), I discover that the probability of CEO turnover significantly increases when a firm fails to meet its performance targets, and the likelihood of CEO replacement becomes even higher when minimum performance targets are missed. In a horse race of various financial measures used, failure to meet earnings targets most significantly increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal, and cash flow matters most when minimum targets are considered. Further, the effect varies with firm characteristics in that failing to meet revenue targets lead to turnover only in growth firms, while only in distressed firms CEOs are more likely to lose the job because of missing cash flow targets. Results are robust to the control of possible selection issues related to performance target disclosure and the choice of financial measures.
DegreeDoctor of Philosophy
SubjectExecutives - Salaries, etc
Dept/ProgramEconomics and Finance
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/216287

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLuo, Jing-
dc.contributor.author羅婧-
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-08T23:11:38Z-
dc.date.available2015-09-08T23:11:38Z-
dc.date.issued2014-
dc.identifier.citationLuo, J. [羅婧]. (2014). The real effects of CEO compensation : evidence from equity and bonus incentive plans. (Thesis). University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong SAR. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b5558962-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/216287-
dc.description.abstractThis thesis consists of two essays exploring the effects of executive compensation contracts on the real economy. Evidence from equity incentive schemes and annual bonus plans are provided separately in the two essays. The first essay examines the relation between CEO option compensation and bank risk-taking, and the role of CEO option compensation in affecting bank performance during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Through panel regressions, I find that over the sample period (1993-2011), option awards received by bank CEO and CEO option holdings lead to higher bank risk which is not rewarded by better performance. Bank CEOs take more risk by engaging more in financial innovation and maintaining more risky loan portfolios. Institutional investors favor high option compensation in their own interests of pursuing short-term stock price upswing, while a larger board corrects this excessive risk-taking by providing bank CEOs with less option compensation. Cross-sectional evidence shows that during the crisis period, the effect of option compensation in increasing risk-taking and worsening performance comes from exercisable option holdings. In addition to the findings regarding option compensation, stock awards are shown to affect bank risk and performance, while stock holdings play no role. In the second essay, using a hand collected sample of 1491 firm-years spanning 2006-2011, for which I have been able to gather from annual incentive schemes performance measures and two levels of corresponding targets which represent board directors’ performance expectations on chief executive officers (CEOs), I discover that the probability of CEO turnover significantly increases when a firm fails to meet its performance targets, and the likelihood of CEO replacement becomes even higher when minimum performance targets are missed. In a horse race of various financial measures used, failure to meet earnings targets most significantly increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal, and cash flow matters most when minimum targets are considered. Further, the effect varies with firm characteristics in that failing to meet revenue targets lead to turnover only in growth firms, while only in distressed firms CEOs are more likely to lose the job because of missing cash flow targets. Results are robust to the control of possible selection issues related to performance target disclosure and the choice of financial measures.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherThe University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong)-
dc.relation.ispartofHKU Theses Online (HKUTO)-
dc.rightsThe author retains all proprietary rights, (such as patent rights) and the right to use in future works.-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.subject.lcshExecutives - Salaries, etc-
dc.titleThe real effects of CEO compensation : evidence from equity and bonus incentive plans-
dc.typePG_Thesis-
dc.identifier.hkulb5558962-
dc.description.thesisnameDoctor of Philosophy-
dc.description.thesislevelDoctoral-
dc.description.thesisdisciplineEconomics and Finance-
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-

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