File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: Task Interdependence And Non-contractibility In Public Good Provision

TitleTask Interdependence And Non-contractibility In Public Good Provision
Authors
Issue Date2014
PublisherMohr Siebeck. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.mohr.de/jite.html
Citation
Journal Of Institutional And Theoretical Economics, 2014, v. 170 n. 4, p. 731-748 How to Cite?
AbstractIn the context of public good provision, despite non-contractibility of investments, it is possible to specify who is in charge of tasks such as construction and maintenance. We show that complementarity between the investments of the two tasks favours unbundling of tasks through different contracts against bundling of them into a single contract, whether the built facility is privately or publicly owned. We also obtain general conditions that determine the efficiency of traditional procurement vis-a-vis public-private partnership (PPP).
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/214697

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChiu, SYW-
dc.contributor.authorChen, BR-
dc.date.accessioned2015-08-21T11:51:57Z-
dc.date.available2015-08-21T11:51:57Z-
dc.date.issued2014-
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Institutional And Theoretical Economics, 2014, v. 170 n. 4, p. 731-748-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/214697-
dc.description.abstractIn the context of public good provision, despite non-contractibility of investments, it is possible to specify who is in charge of tasks such as construction and maintenance. We show that complementarity between the investments of the two tasks favours unbundling of tasks through different contracts against bundling of them into a single contract, whether the built facility is privately or publicly owned. We also obtain general conditions that determine the efficiency of traditional procurement vis-a-vis public-private partnership (PPP).-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherMohr Siebeck. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.mohr.de/jite.html-
dc.relation.ispartofJournal Of Institutional And Theoretical Economics-
dc.titleTask Interdependence And Non-contractibility In Public Good Provision-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailChiu, SYW: sywchiu@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityChiu, SYW=rp01057-
dc.identifier.doi10.1628/093245614X14001382825066-
dc.identifier.hkuros249529-
dc.identifier.volume170-
dc.identifier.issue4-
dc.identifier.spage731-
dc.identifier.epage748-
dc.publisher.placeTübingen, Germany-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats