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Conference Paper: Socially-optimal online spectrum auctions for secondary wireless communication

TitleSocially-optimal online spectrum auctions for secondary wireless communication
Authors
Issue Date2015
PublisherIEEE. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1001779
Citation
The 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM Wksps), Hong Kong, 26 April-1 May 2015. In Conference Proceedings, 2015, p. 1-9 How to Cite?
AbstractSpectrum auctions are efficient mechanisms for licensed users to relinquish their under-utilized spectrum to secondary links for monetary remuneration. Truthfulness and social welfare maximization are two natural goals in such auctions, but cannot be achieved simultaneously with polynomial-time complexity by existing methods, even in a static network with fixed parameters. The challenge escalates in practical systems with QoS requirements and volatile traffic demands for secondary communication. Online, dynamic decisions are required for rate control, channel evaluation/bidding, and packet dropping at each secondary link, as well as for winner determination and pricing at the primary user. This work proposes an online spectrum auction framework with cross-layer decision making and randomized winner determination on the fly. The framework is truthful-inexpectation, and achieves close-to-offline-optimal time-averaged social welfare and individual utilities with polynomial time complexity. A new method is introduced for online channel evaluation in a stochastic setting. Simulation studies further verify the efficacy of the proposed auction in practical scenarios.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/213549

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLi, H-
dc.contributor.authorWu, C-
dc.contributor.authorLi, Z-
dc.date.accessioned2015-08-05T04:38:17Z-
dc.date.available2015-08-05T04:38:17Z-
dc.date.issued2015-
dc.identifier.citationThe 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM Wksps), Hong Kong, 26 April-1 May 2015. In Conference Proceedings, 2015, p. 1-9-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/213549-
dc.description.abstractSpectrum auctions are efficient mechanisms for licensed users to relinquish their under-utilized spectrum to secondary links for monetary remuneration. Truthfulness and social welfare maximization are two natural goals in such auctions, but cannot be achieved simultaneously with polynomial-time complexity by existing methods, even in a static network with fixed parameters. The challenge escalates in practical systems with QoS requirements and volatile traffic demands for secondary communication. Online, dynamic decisions are required for rate control, channel evaluation/bidding, and packet dropping at each secondary link, as well as for winner determination and pricing at the primary user. This work proposes an online spectrum auction framework with cross-layer decision making and randomized winner determination on the fly. The framework is truthful-inexpectation, and achieves close-to-offline-optimal time-averaged social welfare and individual utilities with polynomial time complexity. A new method is introduced for online channel evaluation in a stochastic setting. Simulation studies further verify the efficacy of the proposed auction in practical scenarios.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherIEEE. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1001779-
dc.relation.ispartofIEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops, INFOCOM WKSHPS-
dc.rightsIEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops, INFOCOM WKSHPS. Copyright © IEEE.-
dc.rights©2015 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleSocially-optimal online spectrum auctions for secondary wireless communication-
dc.typeConference_Paper-
dc.identifier.emailWu, C: cwu@cs.hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityWu, C=rp01397-
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.hkuros246575-
dc.identifier.spage1-
dc.identifier.epage9-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-
dc.customcontrol.immutablesml 150805-

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