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Conference Paper: A truthful incentive mechanism for emergency demand response in colocation data centers

TitleA truthful incentive mechanism for emergency demand response in colocation data centers
Authors
Issue Date2015
PublisherIEEE. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1001779
Citation
The 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM Wksps), Hong Kong, 26 April-1 May 2015. In Conference Proceedings, 2015, p. 1-9 How to Cite?
AbstractData centers are key participants in demand response programs, including emergency demand response (EDR), where the grid coordinates large electricity consumers for demand reduction in emergency situations to prevent major economic losses. While existing literature concentrates on owner-operated data centers, this work studies EDR in multi-tenant colocation data centers where servers are owned and managed by individual tenants. EDR in colocation data centers is significantly more challenging, due to lack of incentives to reduce energy consumption by tenants who control their servers and are typically on fixed power contracts with the colocation operator. Consequently, to achieve demand reduction goals set by the EDR program, the operator has to rely on the highly expensive and/or environmentally-unfriendly on-site energy backup/generation. To reduce cost and environmental impact, an efficient incentive mechanism is therefore in need, motivating tenants’ voluntary energy reduction in case of EDR. This work proposes a novel incentive mechanism, Truth-DR, which leverages a reverse auction to provide monetary remuneration to tenants according to their agreed energy reduction. Truth-DR is computationally efficient, truthful, and achieves 2-approximation in colocation-wide social cost. Trace-driven simulations verify the efficacy of the proposed auction mechanism.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/213548

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorZhang, L-
dc.contributor.authorRen, S-
dc.contributor.authorWu, C-
dc.contributor.authorLi, Z-
dc.date.accessioned2015-08-05T04:27:10Z-
dc.date.available2015-08-05T04:27:10Z-
dc.date.issued2015-
dc.identifier.citationThe 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM Wksps), Hong Kong, 26 April-1 May 2015. In Conference Proceedings, 2015, p. 1-9-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/213548-
dc.description.abstractData centers are key participants in demand response programs, including emergency demand response (EDR), where the grid coordinates large electricity consumers for demand reduction in emergency situations to prevent major economic losses. While existing literature concentrates on owner-operated data centers, this work studies EDR in multi-tenant colocation data centers where servers are owned and managed by individual tenants. EDR in colocation data centers is significantly more challenging, due to lack of incentives to reduce energy consumption by tenants who control their servers and are typically on fixed power contracts with the colocation operator. Consequently, to achieve demand reduction goals set by the EDR program, the operator has to rely on the highly expensive and/or environmentally-unfriendly on-site energy backup/generation. To reduce cost and environmental impact, an efficient incentive mechanism is therefore in need, motivating tenants’ voluntary energy reduction in case of EDR. This work proposes a novel incentive mechanism, Truth-DR, which leverages a reverse auction to provide monetary remuneration to tenants according to their agreed energy reduction. Truth-DR is computationally efficient, truthful, and achieves 2-approximation in colocation-wide social cost. Trace-driven simulations verify the efficacy of the proposed auction mechanism.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherIEEE. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1001779-
dc.relation.ispartofIEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops, INFOCOM WKSHPS-
dc.rightsIEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops, INFOCOM WKSHPS. Copyright © IEEE.-
dc.rights©2015 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleA truthful incentive mechanism for emergency demand response in colocation data centers-
dc.typeConference_Paper-
dc.identifier.emailWu, C: cwu@cs.hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityWu, C=rp01397-
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.hkuros246574-
dc.identifier.spage1-
dc.identifier.epage9-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-
dc.customcontrol.immutablesml 150805-

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