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Article: Can Centralized Sanctioning Promote Trust in Social Dilemmas? A Two-level Trust Game with Incomplete Information

TitleCan Centralized Sanctioning Promote Trust in Social Dilemmas? A Two-level Trust Game with Incomplete Information
Authors
Issue Date2015
Citation
PLoS One, 2015, v. 10, n. 4, article no. e0124513 How to Cite?
AbstractThe problem of trust is a paradigmatic social dilemma. Previous literature has paid much academic attention on effects of peer punishment and altruistic third-party punishment on trust and human cooperation in dyadic interactions. However, the effects of centralized sanctioning institutions on decentralized reciprocity in hierarchical interactions remain to be further explored. This paper presents a formal two-level trust game with incomplete information which adds an authority as a strategic purposive actor into the traditional trust game. This model allows scholars to examine the problem of trust in more complex game theoretic configurations. The analysis demonstrates how the centralized institutions might change the dynamics of reciprocity between the trustor and the trustee. Findings suggest that the sequential equilibria of the newly proposed two-level model simultaneously include the risk of placing trust for the trustor and the temptation of short-term defection for the trustee. Moreover, they have shown that even a slight uncertainty about the type of the newly introduced authority might facilitate the establishment of trust and reciprocity in social dilemmas.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/210842

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWang, YR-
dc.contributor.authorNg, CN-
dc.date.accessioned2015-06-23T05:56:30Z-
dc.date.available2015-06-23T05:56:30Z-
dc.date.issued2015-
dc.identifier.citationPLoS One, 2015, v. 10, n. 4, article no. e0124513-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/210842-
dc.description.abstractThe problem of trust is a paradigmatic social dilemma. Previous literature has paid much academic attention on effects of peer punishment and altruistic third-party punishment on trust and human cooperation in dyadic interactions. However, the effects of centralized sanctioning institutions on decentralized reciprocity in hierarchical interactions remain to be further explored. This paper presents a formal two-level trust game with incomplete information which adds an authority as a strategic purposive actor into the traditional trust game. This model allows scholars to examine the problem of trust in more complex game theoretic configurations. The analysis demonstrates how the centralized institutions might change the dynamics of reciprocity between the trustor and the trustee. Findings suggest that the sequential equilibria of the newly proposed two-level model simultaneously include the risk of placing trust for the trustor and the temptation of short-term defection for the trustee. Moreover, they have shown that even a slight uncertainty about the type of the newly introduced authority might facilitate the establishment of trust and reciprocity in social dilemmas.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofPLoS One-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleCan Centralized Sanctioning Promote Trust in Social Dilemmas? A Two-level Trust Game with Incomplete Information-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailNg, CN: cnng@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.emailWang, YR: wangyuray@connect.hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityNg, CN=rp00606-
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.doi10.1371/journal.pone.0124513-
dc.identifier.hkuros244142-
dc.identifier.volume10-

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