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Article: Agreeing to pay under value disagreement: Reconceptualizing preference transformation in terms of pluralism with evidence from small-group deliberations on climate change

TitleAgreeing to pay under value disagreement: Reconceptualizing preference transformation in terms of pluralism with evidence from small-group deliberations on climate change
Authors
KeywordsDeliberative monetary valuation
Climate change
Communicative rationality
Preference transformation
Public deliberation
Value pluralism
Issue Date2013
Citation
Ecological Economics, 2013, v. 87, p. 84-94 How to Cite?
AbstractPlural values contribute to multiple arrays of expressed preferences. Conventionally, preference convergence toward consensus among initially disagreeing decision makers is understood in terms of diminishing value differences. A cogent account of consensual decision that respects non-diminishing value plurality is lacking. Instead there is a theoretic expectation for categorical consistency between subjective values and expressed preferences. Valuing agents in social interaction are expected to indicate identical preference orderings only if they hold correspondingly identical categories of values. This expectation precludes meaningful conceptualization of preference convergence under divisive normative dispositions. An alternative framework is proposed and illustrated by results from a designed deliberative forum on Australia's climate change policy. Data were analyzed based on Q methodology. Results show that small-group deliberations enabled effective communication between distinctive subjective positions and broadened understandings between individuals. While a consensual decision gained progress, no identified value discourse diminished below a significant degree. Observed changes in values did not run parallel to the converging preferences, suggesting a decline in value-preference consistency. These changes nonetheless are amenable to the principle of value pluralism. An alternative rationality concept is needed to account for this moral ideal within economics. © 2012 Elsevier B.V.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/210109
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 3.227
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.733

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLo, Alex Y.-
dc.date.accessioned2015-05-22T06:06:39Z-
dc.date.available2015-05-22T06:06:39Z-
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.identifier.citationEcological Economics, 2013, v. 87, p. 84-94-
dc.identifier.issn0921-8009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/210109-
dc.description.abstractPlural values contribute to multiple arrays of expressed preferences. Conventionally, preference convergence toward consensus among initially disagreeing decision makers is understood in terms of diminishing value differences. A cogent account of consensual decision that respects non-diminishing value plurality is lacking. Instead there is a theoretic expectation for categorical consistency between subjective values and expressed preferences. Valuing agents in social interaction are expected to indicate identical preference orderings only if they hold correspondingly identical categories of values. This expectation precludes meaningful conceptualization of preference convergence under divisive normative dispositions. An alternative framework is proposed and illustrated by results from a designed deliberative forum on Australia's climate change policy. Data were analyzed based on Q methodology. Results show that small-group deliberations enabled effective communication between distinctive subjective positions and broadened understandings between individuals. While a consensual decision gained progress, no identified value discourse diminished below a significant degree. Observed changes in values did not run parallel to the converging preferences, suggesting a decline in value-preference consistency. These changes nonetheless are amenable to the principle of value pluralism. An alternative rationality concept is needed to account for this moral ideal within economics. © 2012 Elsevier B.V.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofEcological Economics-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.rightsNOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in [Ecological Economics]. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in PUBLICATION, [VOL 87, (2013)] DOI 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.12.014-
dc.subjectDeliberative monetary valuation-
dc.subjectClimate change-
dc.subjectCommunicative rationality-
dc.subjectPreference transformation-
dc.subjectPublic deliberation-
dc.subjectValue pluralism-
dc.titleAgreeing to pay under value disagreement: Reconceptualizing preference transformation in terms of pluralism with evidence from small-group deliberations on climate change-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.12.014-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84872974894-
dc.identifier.hkuros244412-
dc.identifier.volume87-
dc.identifier.spage84-
dc.identifier.epage94-

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