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Article: The effect of family governance on corporate time horizons

TitleThe effect of family governance on corporate time horizons
Authors
KeywordsCorporate governance
Family firms
Intertemporal choice
Pressure
Time horizons
Issue Date2013
PublisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/CORG
Citation
Corporate Governance (Oxford), 2013, v. 21 n. 6, p. 547-566 How to Cite?
AbstractManuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This paper empirically tests the effect of family governance on intertemporal choice. We contribute to the literature on corporate time horizons by formulating an innovative approach to the measurement of long-term orientation. This approach uses an index that captures investment, employee, and financing behavior. Research Findings/Insights: Our research makes use of a dataset consisting of 701 German firms (6,205 firm-years) observed over the period from 1995 to 2009. We provide evidence that firms actively managed by founders and/or their families are significantly more long-term oriented than the control group. Our findings also show that these firms persist in maintaining a long-term approach in cases in which pressure on short-term results is high. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This paper supports the hypothesis that trans-generational considerations can result in family-managed firms having longer time horizons. As such, our findings reinforce prior claims that agency outcomes can significantly differ in the context of family governance. Furthermore, our results accentuate the validity of the claim to separately account for multiple aspects of family governance in family firm research, in particular management vs. ownership. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our results will be helpful for investors in selecting investment targets that match their personal time preferences. In particular, it appears difficult to exert pressure on family managers to extract short-term profits. Policymakers may want to consider removing any barriers to the transferring of family firms between generations. Their orientation towards the long-term can make family-run companies sources of stability in their respective economies. This is also due to their less pronounced reaction to pressure. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/210043
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 2.169
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.119

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorKappes, I-
dc.contributor.authorSchmid, T-
dc.date.accessioned2015-05-21T02:57:35Z-
dc.date.available2015-05-21T02:57:35Z-
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.identifier.citationCorporate Governance (Oxford), 2013, v. 21 n. 6, p. 547-566-
dc.identifier.issn0964-8410-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/210043-
dc.description.abstractManuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This paper empirically tests the effect of family governance on intertemporal choice. We contribute to the literature on corporate time horizons by formulating an innovative approach to the measurement of long-term orientation. This approach uses an index that captures investment, employee, and financing behavior. Research Findings/Insights: Our research makes use of a dataset consisting of 701 German firms (6,205 firm-years) observed over the period from 1995 to 2009. We provide evidence that firms actively managed by founders and/or their families are significantly more long-term oriented than the control group. Our findings also show that these firms persist in maintaining a long-term approach in cases in which pressure on short-term results is high. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This paper supports the hypothesis that trans-generational considerations can result in family-managed firms having longer time horizons. As such, our findings reinforce prior claims that agency outcomes can significantly differ in the context of family governance. Furthermore, our results accentuate the validity of the claim to separately account for multiple aspects of family governance in family firm research, in particular management vs. ownership. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our results will be helpful for investors in selecting investment targets that match their personal time preferences. In particular, it appears difficult to exert pressure on family managers to extract short-term profits. Policymakers may want to consider removing any barriers to the transferring of family firms between generations. Their orientation towards the long-term can make family-run companies sources of stability in their respective economies. This is also due to their less pronounced reaction to pressure. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/CORG-
dc.relation.ispartofCorporate Governance (Oxford)-
dc.rightsThe definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com-
dc.subjectCorporate governance-
dc.subjectFamily firms-
dc.subjectIntertemporal choice-
dc.subjectPressure-
dc.subjectTime horizons-
dc.titleThe effect of family governance on corporate time horizons-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailSchmid, T: schmid@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authoritySchmid, T=rp02028-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/corg.12040-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84885482685-
dc.identifier.volume21-
dc.identifier.issue6-
dc.identifier.spage547-
dc.identifier.epage566-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdom-

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