File Download
  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Conference Paper: Valuation Promotes Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing

TitleValuation Promotes Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing
Authors
Issue Date2013
PublisherI E E E. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/mostRecentIssue.jsp?punumber=6821297
Citation
IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), Atlanta, GA, USA, 9-13 December 2013. In Proceedings of the IEEE Global Communications Conference, 2013, p. 3102-3107 How to Cite?
AbstractExisting incentive schemes for peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing are rate-based, giving room for strategic peers to benefit from manipulative behaviors so as to treat honest peers unfairly. Specifically, strategic peers can achieve high performance by providing high upload rates which are useless to the system. On the other hand, honest peers suffer from getting low download rates even if they devote chunks with very high values which do great help to the system and other peers. In this paper, we first show that whether to upload high value chunks or low value ones in BitTorrent is a prisoners' dilemma game. We then propose a novel value-based metric, through which peers are rewarded for uploading high value chunks. We prove that by adopting the value-based metric, chunk exchange becomes a repeated game. Our simulation results indicate that our value-based approach can effectively motivate peers to contribute high value chunks to the system, which, in turn, also benefits from value-based metric by achieving a higher propagation speed of the very first copy of the file.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/204074
ISBN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGuo, Den_US
dc.contributor.authorKwok, YKen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-09-19T20:04:16Z-
dc.date.available2014-09-19T20:04:16Z-
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.identifier.citationIEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), Atlanta, GA, USA, 9-13 December 2013. In Proceedings of the IEEE Global Communications Conference, 2013, p. 3102-3107en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9781479913534-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/204074-
dc.description.abstractExisting incentive schemes for peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing are rate-based, giving room for strategic peers to benefit from manipulative behaviors so as to treat honest peers unfairly. Specifically, strategic peers can achieve high performance by providing high upload rates which are useless to the system. On the other hand, honest peers suffer from getting low download rates even if they devote chunks with very high values which do great help to the system and other peers. In this paper, we first show that whether to upload high value chunks or low value ones in BitTorrent is a prisoners' dilemma game. We then propose a novel value-based metric, through which peers are rewarded for uploading high value chunks. We prove that by adopting the value-based metric, chunk exchange becomes a repeated game. Our simulation results indicate that our value-based approach can effectively motivate peers to contribute high value chunks to the system, which, in turn, also benefits from value-based metric by achieving a higher propagation speed of the very first copy of the file.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherI E E E. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/mostRecentIssue.jsp?punumber=6821297-
dc.relation.ispartofProceedings of the IEEE Global Communications Conferenceen_US
dc.rightsProceedings of the IEEE Global Communications Conference. Copyright © I E E E.-
dc.rights©2013 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleValuation Promotes Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer File-Sharingen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailKwok, YK: ykwok@eee.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityKwok, YK=rp00128en_US
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/GLOCOM.2013.6831548-
dc.identifier.hkuros238458en_US
dc.identifier.spage3102-
dc.identifier.epage3107-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats