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Article: The Impact of Contracts and Competition on Upstream Innovation in a Supply Chain

TitleThe Impact of Contracts and Competition on Upstream Innovation in a Supply Chain
Authors
Issue Date2014
Citation
Production and Operations Management, 2014 How to Cite?
AbstractWe consider a supply chain with an upstream supplier who invests in innovation and a downstream manufacturer who sells to consumers. We study the impact of supply chain contracts with endogenous upstream innovation, focusing on three different contract scenarios: (i) a wholesale price contract, (ii) a quality-dependent wholesale price contract, and (iii) a revenue-sharing contract. We confirm that the revenue-sharing contract can coordinate supply chain decisions including the innovation investment, whereas the other two contracts may result in underinvestment in innovation. However, the downstream manufacturer does not always prefer the revenue-sharing contract; the manufacturer's profit can be higher with a quality-dependent wholesale price contract than with a revenue-sharing contract, specifically when the upstream supplier's innovation cost is low. We then extend our model to incorporate upstream competition between suppliers. By inviting upstream competition, with the wholesale price contract, the manufacturer can increase his profit substantially. Furthermore, under upstream competition, the revenue-sharing contract coordinates the supply chain, and results in an optimal contract form for the manufacturer when suppliers are symmetric. We also analyze the case of complementary components suppliers, and show that most of our results are robust.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/203549
SSRN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWang, Jen_US
dc.contributor.authorShin, HYODUKen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-09-19T15:27:01Z-
dc.date.available2014-09-19T15:27:01Z-
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.identifier.citationProduction and Operations Management, 2014en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/203549-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a supply chain with an upstream supplier who invests in innovation and a downstream manufacturer who sells to consumers. We study the impact of supply chain contracts with endogenous upstream innovation, focusing on three different contract scenarios: (i) a wholesale price contract, (ii) a quality-dependent wholesale price contract, and (iii) a revenue-sharing contract. We confirm that the revenue-sharing contract can coordinate supply chain decisions including the innovation investment, whereas the other two contracts may result in underinvestment in innovation. However, the downstream manufacturer does not always prefer the revenue-sharing contract; the manufacturer's profit can be higher with a quality-dependent wholesale price contract than with a revenue-sharing contract, specifically when the upstream supplier's innovation cost is low. We then extend our model to incorporate upstream competition between suppliers. By inviting upstream competition, with the wholesale price contract, the manufacturer can increase his profit substantially. Furthermore, under upstream competition, the revenue-sharing contract coordinates the supply chain, and results in an optimal contract form for the manufacturer when suppliers are symmetric. We also analyze the case of complementary components suppliers, and show that most of our results are robust.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofProduction and Operations Managementen_US
dc.titleThe Impact of Contracts and Competition on Upstream Innovation in a Supply Chainen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailWang, J: jingqi@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityWang, J=rp01778en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/poms.12218en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros239678en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros229957-
dc.identifier.ssrn2072608-

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