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Conference Paper: Core-Selecting Auctions for Dynamically Allocating Heterogeneous VMs in Cloud Computing

TitleCore-Selecting Auctions for Dynamically Allocating Heterogeneous VMs in Cloud Computing
Authors
Issue Date2014
PublisherI E E E Computer Society.
Citation
The IEEE 7th International Conference on Cloud Computing (CLOUD), Anchorage, Alaska, USA, 27 June -2 July 2014. In the Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing (CLOUD), 2014, p. 152-159 How to Cite?
AbstractIn a cloud market, the cloud provider provisions heterogeneous virtual machine (VM) instances from its resource pool, for allocation to cloud users. Auction-based allocations are efficient in assigning VMs to users who value them the most. Existing auction design often overlooks the heterogeneity of VMs, and does not consider dynamic, demand-driven VM provisioning. Moreover, the classic VCG auction leads to unsatisfactory seller revenues and vulnerability to a strategic bidding behavior known as shill bidding. This work presents a new type of core-selecting VM auctions, which are combinatorial auctions that always select bidder charges from the core of the price vector space, with guaranteed economic efficiency under truthful bidding. These auctions represent a comprehensive three-phase mechanism that instructs the cloud provider to judiciously assemble, allocate, and price VM bundles. They are proof against shills, can improve seller revenue over existing auction mechanisms, and can be tailored to maximize truthfulness.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/201100
ISBN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorFu, Hen_US
dc.contributor.authorLi, Zen_US
dc.contributor.authorWu, Cen_US
dc.contributor.authorChu, Xen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-21T07:13:34Z-
dc.date.available2014-08-21T07:13:34Z-
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.identifier.citationThe IEEE 7th International Conference on Cloud Computing (CLOUD), Anchorage, Alaska, USA, 27 June -2 July 2014. In the Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing (CLOUD), 2014, p. 152-159en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9781479950621-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/201100-
dc.description.abstractIn a cloud market, the cloud provider provisions heterogeneous virtual machine (VM) instances from its resource pool, for allocation to cloud users. Auction-based allocations are efficient in assigning VMs to users who value them the most. Existing auction design often overlooks the heterogeneity of VMs, and does not consider dynamic, demand-driven VM provisioning. Moreover, the classic VCG auction leads to unsatisfactory seller revenues and vulnerability to a strategic bidding behavior known as shill bidding. This work presents a new type of core-selecting VM auctions, which are combinatorial auctions that always select bidder charges from the core of the price vector space, with guaranteed economic efficiency under truthful bidding. These auctions represent a comprehensive three-phase mechanism that instructs the cloud provider to judiciously assemble, allocate, and price VM bundles. They are proof against shills, can improve seller revenue over existing auction mechanisms, and can be tailored to maximize truthfulness.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherI E E E Computer Society.-
dc.relation.ispartofIEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing (CLOUD)en_US
dc.rightsIEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing (CLOUD). Copyright © I E E E Computer Society.-
dc.rights©2014 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleCore-Selecting Auctions for Dynamically Allocating Heterogeneous VMs in Cloud Computingen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailWu, C: cwu@cs.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityWu, C=rp01397en_US
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/CLOUD.2014.30-
dc.identifier.hkuros232129en_US
dc.identifier.spage152-
dc.identifier.epage159-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-

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