File Download
  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
  • Find via Find It@HKUL
Supplementary

Conference Paper: RSMOA: a revenue and social welfare maximizing online auction for dynamic cloud resource provisioning

TitleRSMOA: a revenue and social welfare maximizing online auction for dynamic cloud resource provisioning
Authors
Issue Date2014
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1000600
Citation
The 22nd IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Quality of Service (IWQoS 2014), Hong Kong, China, 26-27 May 2014. In Conference Proceedings, 2014, p. 1-10 How to Cite?
AbstractWe study online cloud resource auctions where users can arrive anytime and bid for heterogeneous types of virtual machines (VMs) assembled and provisioned on the fly. The proposed auction mechanism RSMOA, to the authors’ knowledge, represents the first truthful online mechanism that timely responds to incoming users’ demands and makes dynamic resource provisioning and allocation decisions, while guaranteeing efficiency in both the provider’s revenue and system social welfare. RSMOA consists of two components: (1) an online mechanism that computes resource allocation and users’ payments based on a global, non-decreasing pricing curve, and guarantees truthfulness; (2) a judiciously designed pricing curve, which is derived from a threat-based strategy and guarantees a competitive ratio O(ln(p)) in both system social welfare and the provider’s revenue, as compared to the celebrated offline Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction. Here p is the ratio between the upper and lower bounds of users’ marginal valuation of a type of resource. The efficacy of RSMOA is validated through extensive theoretical analysis and trace-driven simulation studies.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/201095
ISBN
ISSN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorShi, Wen_US
dc.contributor.authorWu, Cen_US
dc.contributor.authorLi, Zen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-21T07:13:33Z-
dc.date.available2014-08-21T07:13:33Z-
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.identifier.citationThe 22nd IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Quality of Service (IWQoS 2014), Hong Kong, China, 26-27 May 2014. In Conference Proceedings, 2014, p. 1-10en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-4799-0913-1-
dc.identifier.issn1548-615X-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/201095-
dc.description.abstractWe study online cloud resource auctions where users can arrive anytime and bid for heterogeneous types of virtual machines (VMs) assembled and provisioned on the fly. The proposed auction mechanism RSMOA, to the authors’ knowledge, represents the first truthful online mechanism that timely responds to incoming users’ demands and makes dynamic resource provisioning and allocation decisions, while guaranteeing efficiency in both the provider’s revenue and system social welfare. RSMOA consists of two components: (1) an online mechanism that computes resource allocation and users’ payments based on a global, non-decreasing pricing curve, and guarantees truthfulness; (2) a judiciously designed pricing curve, which is derived from a threat-based strategy and guarantees a competitive ratio O(ln(p)) in both system social welfare and the provider’s revenue, as compared to the celebrated offline Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction. Here p is the ratio between the upper and lower bounds of users’ marginal valuation of a type of resource. The efficacy of RSMOA is validated through extensive theoretical analysis and trace-driven simulation studies.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1000600-
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Workshop on Quality of Serviceen_US
dc.rightsInternational Workshop on Quality of Service. Copyright © Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.-
dc.rights©2014 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleRSMOA: a revenue and social welfare maximizing online auction for dynamic cloud resource provisioningen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailWu, C: cwu@cs.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityWu, C=rp01397en_US
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.hkuros232124en_US
dc.identifier.spage1-
dc.identifier.epage10-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-
dc.customcontrol.immutablesml 140822-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats