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Article: In Defense of Transcendental Institutionalism

TitleIn Defense of Transcendental Institutionalism
Authors
Issue Date2014
PublisherSage Publications Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journal.aspx?pid=105730
Citation
Philosophy & Social Criticism, 2014, v 40 n. 7, p. 665-682 How to Cite?
AbstractWhat do we want from a theory of justice? Amartya Sen argues that what we should not want is to follow the social contract approach revived by John Rawls, or transcendental institutionalism, in its preoccupation with perfectly just institutions. Sen makes an effective case against approaches, such as G. A. Cohen’s, concerned with transcendent, fact-independent principles of justice, but not against Rawls’ constructivist approach to justice when this is properly interpreted as making a weak transcendental argument. Situating Rawls’ approach within the tradition of the liberalism of freedom provides a basis for interpreting his Kantian constructivism as a form of transcendental institutionalism, and for revealing the affinities between Rawls’ idea of reflective equilibrium and Jürgen Habermas’ method of rational reconstruction. Such a Kantian conception of justice, concerned with constituting relations of equal liberty between free and equal citizens, remains essential for orienting our pursuit of justice.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/200818
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGledhill, JSen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-21T07:02:19Z-
dc.date.available2014-08-21T07:02:19Z-
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.identifier.citationPhilosophy & Social Criticism, 2014, v 40 n. 7, p. 665-682en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/200818-
dc.description.abstractWhat do we want from a theory of justice? Amartya Sen argues that what we should not want is to follow the social contract approach revived by John Rawls, or transcendental institutionalism, in its preoccupation with perfectly just institutions. Sen makes an effective case against approaches, such as G. A. Cohen’s, concerned with transcendent, fact-independent principles of justice, but not against Rawls’ constructivist approach to justice when this is properly interpreted as making a weak transcendental argument. Situating Rawls’ approach within the tradition of the liberalism of freedom provides a basis for interpreting his Kantian constructivism as a form of transcendental institutionalism, and for revealing the affinities between Rawls’ idea of reflective equilibrium and Jürgen Habermas’ method of rational reconstruction. Such a Kantian conception of justice, concerned with constituting relations of equal liberty between free and equal citizens, remains essential for orienting our pursuit of justice.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherSage Publications Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journal.aspx?pid=105730-
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophy & Social Criticismen_US
dc.rightsPhilosophy & Social Criticism. Copyright © Sage Publications Ltd.-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleIn Defense of Transcendental Institutionalismen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailGledhill, JS: gledhill@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityGledhill, JS=rp01783en_US
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/0191453714536431en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros235031en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000340828000004-

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