File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: Organizational Clientelism: An Analysis of Private Entrepreneurs in Chinese Local Legislatures

TitleOrganizational Clientelism: An Analysis of Private Entrepreneurs in Chinese Local Legislatures
Authors
Issue Date2014
PublisherLynne Rienner Publishers. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.rienner.com/viewbook.cfm?BOOKID=1354&search=Journal%20of%20East%20Asian%20Studies
Citation
Journal of East Asian Studies, 2014, v. 14, p. 1-29 How to Cite?
AbstractExtant literature on authoritarian legislatures argues that dictators set up quasi-democratic institutions to co-opt opposition and attract investors. We argue that dictators also nurture clientelistic ties with social groups useful to their rule, a previously overlooked function of authoritarian legislatures. Drawing on the case of Chinese local legislatures—namely, the local People's Congress and the local People's Political Consultative Conference—we find that Chinese local governments use these institutions to channel patronage to and gain political support from the private sector. Field interviews and an analysis of a nationwide firm-level survey show that private firms owned by local legislative members, while obtaining more bank loans, provide more support to the local government in various forms than those owned by nonmembers. This finding suggests that authoritarian legislatures, even those with weak policymaking efficacy, can help authoritarian states build stable alliances with social groups, thereby contributing to regime resilience.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/196856
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.303
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.224

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSun, Xen_US
dc.contributor.authorZhu, Jen_US
dc.contributor.authorWu, Yen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-04-29T03:46:25Z-
dc.date.available2014-04-29T03:46:25Z-
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal of East Asian Studies, 2014, v. 14, p. 1-29en_US
dc.identifier.issn1598-2408en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/196856-
dc.description.abstractExtant literature on authoritarian legislatures argues that dictators set up quasi-democratic institutions to co-opt opposition and attract investors. We argue that dictators also nurture clientelistic ties with social groups useful to their rule, a previously overlooked function of authoritarian legislatures. Drawing on the case of Chinese local legislatures—namely, the local People's Congress and the local People's Political Consultative Conference—we find that Chinese local governments use these institutions to channel patronage to and gain political support from the private sector. Field interviews and an analysis of a nationwide firm-level survey show that private firms owned by local legislative members, while obtaining more bank loans, provide more support to the local government in various forms than those owned by nonmembers. This finding suggests that authoritarian legislatures, even those with weak policymaking efficacy, can help authoritarian states build stable alliances with social groups, thereby contributing to regime resilience.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherLynne Rienner Publishers. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.rienner.com/viewbook.cfm?BOOKID=1354&search=Journal%20of%20East%20Asian%20Studiesen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of East Asian Studiesen_US
dc.titleOrganizational Clientelism: An Analysis of Private Entrepreneurs in Chinese Local Legislaturesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailZhu, J: zhujn@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityZhu, J=rp01624en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.5555/1598-2408-14.1.1en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros228689en_US
dc.identifier.volume14en_US
dc.identifier.spage1en_US
dc.identifier.epage29en_US
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_US

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats