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Article: Corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure

TitleCorporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure
Authors
KeywordsOwnership structure
Excess control rights
Syndicated loans
Issue Date2012
PublisherElsevier. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/0304405X
Citation
Journal of Financial Economics, 2012, v. 104 n. 1, p. 1-22 How to Cite?
AbstractUsing a novel data set on corporate ownership and control, we show that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant impact on the concentration and composition of the firm's loan syndicate. When the control-ownership divergence is large, lead arrangers form syndicates with structures that facilitate enhanced due diligence and monitoring efforts. These syndicates tend to be relatively concentrated and composed of domestic banks that are geographically close to the borrowing firms and that have lending expertise related to the industries of the borrowers. We also examine factors that influence the relation between ownership structure and syndicate structure, including lead arranger reputation, prior lending relationship, borrowing firm informational opacity, presence of multiple large owners, laws and institutions, and financial crises.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/192341
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 3.541
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 9.920
SSRN
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLin, Cen_US
dc.contributor.authorMa, Yen_US
dc.contributor.authorMalatesta, Pen_US
dc.contributor.authorXuan, Yen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-24T01:50:03Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-24T01:50:03Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Financial Economics, 2012, v. 104 n. 1, p. 1-22en_US
dc.identifier.issn0304-405Xen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/192341-
dc.description.abstractUsing a novel data set on corporate ownership and control, we show that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant impact on the concentration and composition of the firm's loan syndicate. When the control-ownership divergence is large, lead arrangers form syndicates with structures that facilitate enhanced due diligence and monitoring efforts. These syndicates tend to be relatively concentrated and composed of domestic banks that are geographically close to the borrowing firms and that have lending expertise related to the industries of the borrowers. We also examine factors that influence the relation between ownership structure and syndicate structure, including lead arranger reputation, prior lending relationship, borrowing firm informational opacity, presence of multiple large owners, laws and institutions, and financial crises.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherElsevier. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/0304405X-
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Financial Economicsen_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.rightsNOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in <Journal of Financial Economics>. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in PUBLICATION, [VOL 104, ISSUE 1, (2012)] DOI 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.10.006-
dc.subjectOwnership structure-
dc.subjectExcess control rights-
dc.subjectSyndicated loans-
dc.titleCorporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structureen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.10.006en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84857456890en_US
dc.identifier.volume104en_US
dc.identifier.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.spage1en_US
dc.identifier.epage22en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000301092100001-
dc.identifier.ssrn1727752-

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