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Article: Does state control affect managerial incentives? Evidence from china's publicly listed firms

TitleDoes state control affect managerial incentives? Evidence from china's publicly listed firms
Authors
KeywordsManagerial incentives
State control
Corporate governance
Partial privatization
China
Issue Date2009
Citation
Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2009, v. 10 n. 4, p. 291-311 How to Cite?
AbstractUsing data for 1203 publicly listed firms in China during 1999–2002, this paper empirically investigates whether and to what extent state control affects managerial incentives, including managerial compensation and CEO turnover. The paper finds that CEO turnover is negatively related to both current and lagged firm performance as measured by ROA and RPE (Relative Performance Evaluation) for non‐state‐controlled firms, while insensitive to performance measures for state‐controlled firms. In addition, CEO compensation is positively related to firm performance, but state ownership and control weaken this positive relation. Moreover, state control reduces the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms such as the board of directors and supervisory committee. Overall, empirical results in the paper indicate that state ownership and control weaken managerial incentives and internal monitoring among publicly listed firms in China.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/192332
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.618
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.361
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLin, Cen_US
dc.contributor.authorSu, Den_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-24T01:49:59Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-24T01:49:59Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Business Economics and Management, 2009, v. 10 n. 4, p. 291-311en_US
dc.identifier.issn1611-1699en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/192332-
dc.description.abstractUsing data for 1203 publicly listed firms in China during 1999–2002, this paper empirically investigates whether and to what extent state control affects managerial incentives, including managerial compensation and CEO turnover. The paper finds that CEO turnover is negatively related to both current and lagged firm performance as measured by ROA and RPE (Relative Performance Evaluation) for non‐state‐controlled firms, while insensitive to performance measures for state‐controlled firms. In addition, CEO compensation is positively related to firm performance, but state ownership and control weaken this positive relation. Moreover, state control reduces the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms such as the board of directors and supervisory committee. Overall, empirical results in the paper indicate that state ownership and control weaken managerial incentives and internal monitoring among publicly listed firms in China.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Business Economics and Managementen_US
dc.subjectManagerial incentives-
dc.subjectState control-
dc.subjectCorporate governance-
dc.subjectPartial privatization-
dc.subjectChina-
dc.titleDoes state control affect managerial incentives? Evidence from china's publicly listed firmsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.3846/1611-1699.2009.10.291-311en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-76049107865en_US
dc.identifier.volume10en_US
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.spage291en_US
dc.identifier.epage311en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000272880600002-

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