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Article: Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world

TitlePolitical decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world
Authors
KeywordsCorruption
Decentralization
Political economy
Issue Date2009
PublisherElsevier. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00472727
Citation
Journal of Public Economics, 2009, v. 93 n. 1-2, p. 14-34 How to Cite?
AbstractHow does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials? Previous empirical studies, using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization, have suggested conflicting conclusions. In search of more precise findings, we combine and explore two new data sources—an original cross-national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms' concrete experiences with bribery. In countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and (given local revenues) a larger number of local public employees, reported bribery was more frequent. When local—or central—governments received a larger share of GDP in revenue, bribery was less frequent. Overall, the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent-seeking as government structures become more complex.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/192328
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.44
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.267
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorFan, CSen_US
dc.contributor.authorLin, Cen_US
dc.contributor.authorTreisman, Den_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-24T01:49:57Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-24T01:49:57Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Public Economics, 2009, v. 93 n. 1-2, p. 14-34en_US
dc.identifier.issn0047-2727en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/192328-
dc.description.abstractHow does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials? Previous empirical studies, using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization, have suggested conflicting conclusions. In search of more precise findings, we combine and explore two new data sources—an original cross-national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms' concrete experiences with bribery. In countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and (given local revenues) a larger number of local public employees, reported bribery was more frequent. When local—or central—governments received a larger share of GDP in revenue, bribery was less frequent. Overall, the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent-seeking as government structures become more complex.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherElsevier. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00472727-
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Public Economicsen_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.rightsNOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Public Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in PUBLICATION, [VOL 93, ISSUE 1-2, (2009)] DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.09.001-
dc.subjectCorruption-
dc.subjectDecentralization-
dc.subjectPolitical economy-
dc.titlePolitical decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the worlden_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.09.001en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-57749199314en_US
dc.identifier.volume93en_US
dc.identifier.issue1-2en_US
dc.identifier.spage14en_US
dc.identifier.epage34en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000262875900002-

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