File Download
  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

postgraduate thesis: Why do firms keep silent about upcoming earnings disappointments?

TitleWhy do firms keep silent about upcoming earnings disappointments?
Authors
Issue Date2013
PublisherThe University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong)
Citation
Bae, J. [裴志憲]. (2013). Why do firms keep silent about upcoming earnings disappointments?. (Thesis). University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong SAR. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b5066217
AbstractI investigate why the majority of firms do not issue earnings warnings in the face of upcoming earnings disappointments. SEC Rule 10b-5 imposes a duty on managers to correct or update when they discover that prior disclosures are misleading. I posit that managers assess the 10b-5 duty to disclose based on private information about optimism and misstatements embedded in their prior disclosures. Specifically, I hypothesize that managers who did not issue forecasts or managers who previously issued non-optimistic forecasts are more likely to be silent about upcoming earnings disappointments than managers who previously issued optimistic forecasts. I also hypothesize that managers who perceive that prior disclosures include misstatements that are difficult to verify in the court are more likely to remain silent than are managers who perceive that prior disclosures include misstatements that are easy to verify in the court. My results support these hypotheses. In additional tests, after controlling for the endogeneity between warnings and the likelihood of litigation, I find that earnings warnings issued by managers who perceive that they are not bound by a duty to disclose increase litigation risk. I also find that warnings by firms with misstatements containing less verifiable information do not reduce settlement costs when these firms are sued. Overall, my evidence indicates that when managers perceive that they have no duty to disclose, their earnings warnings are likely to have an adverse impact on litigation risk and, thus, managers are likely to remain silent to avoid this outcome.
DegreeDoctor of Philosophy
SubjectSecurities.
Disclosure of information.
Dept/ProgramBusiness
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/191192

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBae, Ji-hun.-
dc.contributor.author裴志憲.-
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-30T15:52:27Z-
dc.date.available2013-09-30T15:52:27Z-
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.identifier.citationBae, J. [裴志憲]. (2013). Why do firms keep silent about upcoming earnings disappointments?. (Thesis). University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong SAR. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b5066217-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/191192-
dc.description.abstractI investigate why the majority of firms do not issue earnings warnings in the face of upcoming earnings disappointments. SEC Rule 10b-5 imposes a duty on managers to correct or update when they discover that prior disclosures are misleading. I posit that managers assess the 10b-5 duty to disclose based on private information about optimism and misstatements embedded in their prior disclosures. Specifically, I hypothesize that managers who did not issue forecasts or managers who previously issued non-optimistic forecasts are more likely to be silent about upcoming earnings disappointments than managers who previously issued optimistic forecasts. I also hypothesize that managers who perceive that prior disclosures include misstatements that are difficult to verify in the court are more likely to remain silent than are managers who perceive that prior disclosures include misstatements that are easy to verify in the court. My results support these hypotheses. In additional tests, after controlling for the endogeneity between warnings and the likelihood of litigation, I find that earnings warnings issued by managers who perceive that they are not bound by a duty to disclose increase litigation risk. I also find that warnings by firms with misstatements containing less verifiable information do not reduce settlement costs when these firms are sued. Overall, my evidence indicates that when managers perceive that they have no duty to disclose, their earnings warnings are likely to have an adverse impact on litigation risk and, thus, managers are likely to remain silent to avoid this outcome.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherThe University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong)-
dc.relation.ispartofHKU Theses Online (HKUTO)-
dc.rightsThe author retains all proprietary rights, (such as patent rights) and the right to use in future works.-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.source.urihttp://hub.hku.hk/bib/B5066217X-
dc.subject.lcshSecurities.-
dc.subject.lcshDisclosure of information.-
dc.titleWhy do firms keep silent about upcoming earnings disappointments?-
dc.typePG_Thesis-
dc.identifier.hkulb5066217-
dc.description.thesisnameDoctor of Philosophy-
dc.description.thesislevelDoctoral-
dc.description.thesisdisciplineBusiness-
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.doi10.5353/th_b5066217-
dc.date.hkucongregation2013-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats