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Book Chapter: Bargaining, Competition, and Efficient Investment

TitleBargaining, Competition, and Efficient Investment
Authors
Issue Date2013
PublisherWorld Scientific
Citation
Bargaining, Competition, and Efficient Investment. In Chatterjee, K (Ed.), Bargaining in the shadow of the market: selected papers on bilateral and multilateral bargaining, p. 79-95. Singapore ; Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2013 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper explores the interplay between choice of investment type (specific vs. general), bargaining extensive form and endogenous outside options in the framework of incomplete contracts introduced formally in the work of Grossman, Hart and Moore. We find that the bargaining procedure chosen has significant implications for choice of investment and for the usefulness of the assignment of property rights in enhancing efficiency. Somewhat paradoxically an “auction-like” procedure might need the correct assignment of property rights for a more efficient solution while a sequential offers procedure might do as well as the best assignment of property rights.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/188095
ISBN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChatterjee, Ken_US
dc.contributor.authorChiu, SYWen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-08-21T07:31:03Z-
dc.date.available2013-08-21T07:31:03Z-
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.identifier.citationBargaining, Competition, and Efficient Investment. In Chatterjee, K (Ed.), Bargaining in the shadow of the market: selected papers on bilateral and multilateral bargaining, p. 79-95. Singapore ; Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2013en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9789814447560en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/188095-
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores the interplay between choice of investment type (specific vs. general), bargaining extensive form and endogenous outside options in the framework of incomplete contracts introduced formally in the work of Grossman, Hart and Moore. We find that the bargaining procedure chosen has significant implications for choice of investment and for the usefulness of the assignment of property rights in enhancing efficiency. Somewhat paradoxically an “auction-like” procedure might need the correct assignment of property rights for a more efficient solution while a sequential offers procedure might do as well as the best assignment of property rights.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherWorld Scientificen_US
dc.relation.ispartofBargaining in the shadow of the market: selected papers on bilateral and multilateral bargainingen_US
dc.titleBargaining, Competition, and Efficient Investmenten_US
dc.typeBook_Chapteren_US
dc.identifier.emailChiu, SYW: schiu@econ.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityChiu, SYW=rp01057en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1142/9789814447577_0004-
dc.identifier.hkuros220694en_US
dc.identifier.spage79en_US
dc.identifier.epage95en_US
dc.publisher.placeSingapore ; Hackensack, NJen_US

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