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Conference Paper: Optimizing social welfare for network bargaining games in the face of unstability, greed and spite

TitleOptimizing social welfare for network bargaining games in the face of unstability, greed and spite
Authors
KeywordsBargaining game
Distributed protocols
Human nature
Social welfare
Unstability
Issue Date2012
PublisherSpringer Verlag. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.com/content/105633/
Citation
The 20th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2012), Ljubljana, Slovenia, 10-12 September 2012. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2012, v. 7501, p. 265-276 How to Cite?
AbstractStable and balanced outcomes of network bargaining games have been investigated recently, but the existence of such outcomes requires that the linear program relaxation of a certain maximum matching problem has integral optimal solution. We propose an alternative model for network bargaining games in which each edge acts as a player, who proposes how to split the weight of the edge among the two incident nodes. Based on the proposals made by all edges, a selection process will return a set of accepted proposals, subject to node capacities. An edge receives a commission if its proposal is accepted. The social welfare can be measured by the weight of the matching returned. The node users, as opposed to being rational players as in previous works, exhibit two characteristics of human nature: greed and spite. We define these notions formally and show that the distributed protocol by Kanoria et. al can be modified to be run by the edge players such that the configuration of proposals will converge to a pure Nash Equilibrium, without the LP integrality gap assumption. Moreover, after the nodes have made their greedy and spiteful choices, the remaining ambiguous choices can be resolved in a way such that there exists a Nash Equilibrium that will not hurt the social welfare too much. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
DescriptionLNCS v. 7501 entitled: Algorithms - ESA 2012 : 20th annual European symposium ... proceedings
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/186489
ISBN
ISSN
2005 Impact Factor: 0.402
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.252

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChan, HTHen_US
dc.contributor.authorChen, Fen_US
dc.contributor.authorNing, Len_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-08-20T12:11:11Z-
dc.date.available2013-08-20T12:11:11Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.citationThe 20th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2012), Ljubljana, Slovenia, 10-12 September 2012. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2012, v. 7501, p. 265-276en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-364233089-6-
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/186489-
dc.descriptionLNCS v. 7501 entitled: Algorithms - ESA 2012 : 20th annual European symposium ... proceedings-
dc.description.abstractStable and balanced outcomes of network bargaining games have been investigated recently, but the existence of such outcomes requires that the linear program relaxation of a certain maximum matching problem has integral optimal solution. We propose an alternative model for network bargaining games in which each edge acts as a player, who proposes how to split the weight of the edge among the two incident nodes. Based on the proposals made by all edges, a selection process will return a set of accepted proposals, subject to node capacities. An edge receives a commission if its proposal is accepted. The social welfare can be measured by the weight of the matching returned. The node users, as opposed to being rational players as in previous works, exhibit two characteristics of human nature: greed and spite. We define these notions formally and show that the distributed protocol by Kanoria et. al can be modified to be run by the edge players such that the configuration of proposals will converge to a pure Nash Equilibrium, without the LP integrality gap assumption. Moreover, after the nodes have made their greedy and spiteful choices, the remaining ambiguous choices can be resolved in a way such that there exists a Nash Equilibrium that will not hurt the social welfare too much. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.com/content/105633/-
dc.relation.ispartofLecture Notes in Computer Scienceen_US
dc.rightsThe original publication is available at www.springerlink.com-
dc.subjectBargaining game-
dc.subjectDistributed protocols-
dc.subjectHuman nature-
dc.subjectSocial welfare-
dc.subjectUnstability-
dc.titleOptimizing social welfare for network bargaining games in the face of unstability, greed and spiteen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailChan, HTH: hubert@cs.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityChan, HTH=rp01312en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-642-33090-2_24-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84866681019-
dc.identifier.hkuros219186en_US
dc.identifier.volume7501-
dc.identifier.spage265-
dc.identifier.epage276-
dc.publisher.placeGermany-
dc.customcontrol.immutablesml 140415-

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