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Conference Paper: Leakage-Resilient Certificateless Public Key Encryption

TitleLeakage-Resilient Certificateless Public Key Encryption
Authors
Issue Date2013
PublisherThe Association for Computing Machinery (ACM).
Citation
AsiaPKC'13: Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop on Asia Public-Key Cryptography, Hangzhou, China, 8 May 2013, p. 13-22 How to Cite?
AbstractIn certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE), the Private Key Generator (PKG) keeps a master secret key to generate a partial private key corresponding to a user's identity. Together with a secret value generated by the user, a full private key can be constructed for decryption. Traditional security model for CL-PKE assumes that (i) both the master secret key of the PKG and the full private key of the user under attack are in absolute secrecy; and (ii) the attacker can only obtain either the target user's secret value without any partial knowledge of the partial private key or vice versa. However, the advancement of practical side-channel attacks enable attackers to obtain partial information of both keys easily, making the above assumption invalid. In this paper, we give the first leakage-resilient CL-PKE. We consider different leakage conditions for Type I (third party attackers) and Type II (honest-but-curious PKG) attackers, following the classification in traditional CL-PKE. We give a concrete construction in the composite order bilinear group. We prove the security of our scheme in the standard model, overcoming some technical difficulties in the security proofs for both Type I and Type II attackers of CL-PKE. © 2013 ACM.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/184860
ISBN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorXiong, Hen_US
dc.contributor.authorYuen, THen_US
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Cen_US
dc.contributor.authorYiu, SMen_US
dc.contributor.authorHe, YJen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-07-15T10:14:44Z-
dc.date.available2013-07-15T10:14:44Z-
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.identifier.citationAsiaPKC'13: Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop on Asia Public-Key Cryptography, Hangzhou, China, 8 May 2013, p. 13-22en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9781450320696-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/184860-
dc.description.abstractIn certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE), the Private Key Generator (PKG) keeps a master secret key to generate a partial private key corresponding to a user's identity. Together with a secret value generated by the user, a full private key can be constructed for decryption. Traditional security model for CL-PKE assumes that (i) both the master secret key of the PKG and the full private key of the user under attack are in absolute secrecy; and (ii) the attacker can only obtain either the target user's secret value without any partial knowledge of the partial private key or vice versa. However, the advancement of practical side-channel attacks enable attackers to obtain partial information of both keys easily, making the above assumption invalid. In this paper, we give the first leakage-resilient CL-PKE. We consider different leakage conditions for Type I (third party attackers) and Type II (honest-but-curious PKG) attackers, following the classification in traditional CL-PKE. We give a concrete construction in the composite order bilinear group. We prove the security of our scheme in the standard model, overcoming some technical difficulties in the security proofs for both Type I and Type II attackers of CL-PKE. © 2013 ACM.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherThe Association for Computing Machinery (ACM).en_US
dc.relation.ispartofACM Workshop on Asia public-key Cryptographyen_US
dc.titleLeakage-Resilient Certificateless Public Key Encryptionen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailYuen, TH: johnyuen@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.emailZhang, C: congz@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.emailYiu, SM: smyiu@cs.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityYiu, SM=rp00207en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1145/2484389.2484394-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84877995564-
dc.identifier.hkuros215068en_US
dc.identifier.spage13en_US
dc.identifier.epage22en_US
dc.publisher.placeNew York, NY, USA-

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