File Download
  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
  • Find via Find It@HKUL
Supplementary

Article: Contractual agreements and neighbourhood evolution

TitleContractual agreements and neighbourhood evolution
Authors
Issue Date2001
PublisherUniversity of Southern California. The Journal's web site is located at http://www-pam.usc.edu/index.html
Citation
Planning and Markets, 2001, v. 4 n. 1 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper presents a simulation of urban neighbourhood formation and growth based on the economic theory of property rights. The simulation shows that stable and efficient neighbourhoods can evolve from a random distribution of "good" neighbours who offer voluntary reductions in the activities that reduce the welfare of neighbours. However, such neighbourhoods may not evolve and the city may fragment into inefficient neighbourhoods in which the normal prisoner's dilemma dynamic holds; or into unstable neighbourhoods. Which type of city emerges is purely a matter of chance and depends on the initial spatial distribution of good neighbours.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/184055
ISSN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWebster, Cen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-06-20T08:27:37Z-
dc.date.available2013-06-20T08:27:37Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.citationPlanning and Markets, 2001, v. 4 n. 1en_US
dc.identifier.issn1548-6036-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/184055-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a simulation of urban neighbourhood formation and growth based on the economic theory of property rights. The simulation shows that stable and efficient neighbourhoods can evolve from a random distribution of "good" neighbours who offer voluntary reductions in the activities that reduce the welfare of neighbours. However, such neighbourhoods may not evolve and the city may fragment into inefficient neighbourhoods in which the normal prisoner's dilemma dynamic holds; or into unstable neighbourhoods. Which type of city emerges is purely a matter of chance and depends on the initial spatial distribution of good neighbours.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Southern California. The Journal's web site is located at http://www-pam.usc.edu/index.html-
dc.relation.ispartofPlanning and Marketsen_US
dc.titleContractual agreements and neighbourhood evolutionen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailWebster, CJ: cwebster@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityWebster, CJ=rp01747en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_OA_fulltext-
dc.identifier.volume4en_US
dc.publisher.placeLos Angeles-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats