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Article: Contractual agreements and neighbourhood evolution
Title | Contractual agreements and neighbourhood evolution |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2001 |
Publisher | University of Southern California. The Journal's web site is located at http://www-pam.usc.edu/index.html |
Citation | Planning and Markets, 2001, v. 4 n. 1 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This paper presents a simulation of urban neighbourhood formation and growth based on the economic theory of property rights. The simulation shows that stable and efficient neighbourhoods can evolve from a random distribution of "good" neighbours who offer voluntary reductions in the activities that reduce the welfare of neighbours. However, such neighbourhoods may not evolve and the city may fragment into inefficient neighbourhoods in which the normal prisoner's dilemma dynamic holds; or into unstable neighbourhoods. Which type of city emerges is purely a matter of chance and depends on the initial spatial distribution of good neighbours. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/184055 |
ISSN |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Webster, C | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-06-20T08:27:37Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2013-06-20T08:27:37Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2001 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Planning and Markets, 2001, v. 4 n. 1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1548-6036 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/184055 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper presents a simulation of urban neighbourhood formation and growth based on the economic theory of property rights. The simulation shows that stable and efficient neighbourhoods can evolve from a random distribution of "good" neighbours who offer voluntary reductions in the activities that reduce the welfare of neighbours. However, such neighbourhoods may not evolve and the city may fragment into inefficient neighbourhoods in which the normal prisoner's dilemma dynamic holds; or into unstable neighbourhoods. Which type of city emerges is purely a matter of chance and depends on the initial spatial distribution of good neighbours. | - |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | University of Southern California. The Journal's web site is located at http://www-pam.usc.edu/index.html | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Planning and Markets | en_US |
dc.title | Contractual agreements and neighbourhood evolution | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.email | Webster, CJ: cwebster@hku.hk | en_US |
dc.identifier.authority | Webster, CJ=rp01747 | en_US |
dc.description.nature | link_to_OA_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 4 | en_US |
dc.publisher.place | Los Angeles | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 1548-6036 | - |