File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: How foreign firms curtail local supplier opportunism in China: Detailed contracts, centralized control, and relational governance

TitleHow foreign firms curtail local supplier opportunism in China: Detailed contracts, centralized control, and relational governance
Authors
KeywordsBuyer-Supplier Exchange
China
Opportunism
Relational Exchange Theory
Transaction Cost Economics
Issue Date2012
PublisherPalgrave Macmillan Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jibs/index.html
Citation
Journal Of International Business Studies, 2012, v. 43 n. 7, p. 677-692 How to Cite?
AbstractAn ongoing debate in the interfirm exchange literature concerns whether economic and social governance mechanisms function as substitutes or complements. We advance a more nuanced approach to examining how detailed contracts and centralized control interact with relational governance differentially in curbing local supplier opportunism in emerging markets. We suggest that where legal institutions are weak, detailed contracts are ineffective in containing partner opportunism in contractually specified areas. Under such circumstances, relational governance provides a proxy for legal institutions to ensure contract execution. Meanwhile, relational governance serves as an alternative mechanism to centralized control for ensuring contingency adaptations. Based on a sample of 168 foreign buyer-local supplier exchanges in China, we find that relational governance complements detailed contracts but substitutes for centralized control in curtailing opportunism. Therefore foreign firms must be cautious in their combinative use of social and economic mechanisms in governing exchanges with local suppliers in emerging markets. © 2012 Academy of International Business All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/178084
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 3.62
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 4.208
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorZhou, KZen_US
dc.contributor.authorXu, Den_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:41:51Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:41:51Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of International Business Studies, 2012, v. 43 n. 7, p. 677-692en_US
dc.identifier.issn0047-2506en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/178084-
dc.description.abstractAn ongoing debate in the interfirm exchange literature concerns whether economic and social governance mechanisms function as substitutes or complements. We advance a more nuanced approach to examining how detailed contracts and centralized control interact with relational governance differentially in curbing local supplier opportunism in emerging markets. We suggest that where legal institutions are weak, detailed contracts are ineffective in containing partner opportunism in contractually specified areas. Under such circumstances, relational governance provides a proxy for legal institutions to ensure contract execution. Meanwhile, relational governance serves as an alternative mechanism to centralized control for ensuring contingency adaptations. Based on a sample of 168 foreign buyer-local supplier exchanges in China, we find that relational governance complements detailed contracts but substitutes for centralized control in curtailing opportunism. Therefore foreign firms must be cautious in their combinative use of social and economic mechanisms in governing exchanges with local suppliers in emerging markets. © 2012 Academy of International Business All rights reserved.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherPalgrave Macmillan Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jibs/index.htmlen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of International Business Studiesen_US
dc.subjectBuyer-Supplier Exchangeen_US
dc.subjectChinaen_US
dc.subjectOpportunismen_US
dc.subjectRelational Exchange Theoryen_US
dc.subjectTransaction Cost Economicsen_US
dc.titleHow foreign firms curtail local supplier opportunism in China: Detailed contracts, centralized control, and relational governanceen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailZhou, KZ: kevinz@hkucc.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.emailXu, D: dxu@business.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityZhou, KZ=rp01127en_US
dc.identifier.authorityXu, D=rp01119en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1057/jibs.2012.7en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84866916093en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros215942-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-84866916093&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume43en_US
dc.identifier.issue7en_US
dc.identifier.spage677en_US
dc.identifier.epage692en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000309548800004-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhou, KZ=7202914654en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridXu, D=7404073938en_US

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats