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Article: Voluntary disclosure of balance sheet information in quarterly earnings announcements

TitleVoluntary disclosure of balance sheet information in quarterly earnings announcements
Authors
KeywordsCapital Market
Voluntary Disclosure
Issue Date2002
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jae
Citation
Journal Of Accounting And Economics, 2002, v. 33 n. 2, p. 229-251 How to Cite?
AbstractWe investigate a pervasive voluntary disclosure practice-managers including balance sheets with quarterly earnings announcements. Consistent with expectations, we find that managers voluntarily disclose balance sheets when current earnings are relatively less informative, or when future earnings are relatively more uncertain. Specifically, balance sheet disclosures are more likely among firms: (1) in high technology industries; (2) reporting losses; (3) with larger forecast errors; (4) engaging in mergers or acquisitions; (5) that are younger; and (6) with more volatile stock returns. This is consistent with managers disclosing balance sheets in response to investor demand for value relevant information to supplement earnings. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177896
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 3.535
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 6.834
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChen, Sen_US
dc.contributor.authorDefond, MLen_US
dc.contributor.authorPark, CWen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:40:44Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:40:44Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Accounting And Economics, 2002, v. 33 n. 2, p. 229-251en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-4101en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177896-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate a pervasive voluntary disclosure practice-managers including balance sheets with quarterly earnings announcements. Consistent with expectations, we find that managers voluntarily disclose balance sheets when current earnings are relatively less informative, or when future earnings are relatively more uncertain. Specifically, balance sheet disclosures are more likely among firms: (1) in high technology industries; (2) reporting losses; (3) with larger forecast errors; (4) engaging in mergers or acquisitions; (5) that are younger; and (6) with more volatile stock returns. This is consistent with managers disclosing balance sheets in response to investor demand for value relevant information to supplement earnings. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jaeen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Accounting and Economicsen_US
dc.subjectCapital Marketen_US
dc.subjectVoluntary Disclosureen_US
dc.titleVoluntary disclosure of balance sheet information in quarterly earnings announcementsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailPark, CW: acparkc@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityPark, CW=rp01090en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0165-4101(02)00043-5en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0036272219en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0036272219&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume33en_US
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.spage229en_US
dc.identifier.epage251en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000177079600004-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChen, S=14044745200en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridDeFond, ML=6602107693en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridPark, CW=37062708100en_US

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