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Article: Some two-echelon style-goods inventory models with asymmetric market information

TitleSome two-echelon style-goods inventory models with asymmetric market information
Authors
KeywordsAsymmetric Information
Inventory
Newsboy Problem
Pricing
Issue Date2001
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ejor
Citation
European Journal Of Operational Research, 2001, v. 134 n. 1, p. 29-42 How to Cite?
AbstractA "two-echelon" newsboy problem considers the interactive decisions between the "manufacturer" and the "retailer" - now recognized as two separate entities. Earlier papers on this problem assumed that the two parties share the same market information. We extend this problem by studying the situation in which the retailer has better market information than the manufacturer. Presented are several decision models that should be useful for guiding a manufacturer's decisions. Moreover, solutions to these models lead to various unexpected and interesting conclusions. For example, we found that improved retailer's market-knowledge always benefits the manufacturer and the system, though not necessarily the retailer himself. In contrast, improved manufacturer's knowledge benefits only the manufacturer himself at the expense of the retailer and of the system. © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177885
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 2.679
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.595
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHingLing Lau, Aen_US
dc.contributor.authorLau, HSen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:40:41Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:40:41Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.citationEuropean Journal Of Operational Research, 2001, v. 134 n. 1, p. 29-42en_US
dc.identifier.issn0377-2217en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177885-
dc.description.abstractA "two-echelon" newsboy problem considers the interactive decisions between the "manufacturer" and the "retailer" - now recognized as two separate entities. Earlier papers on this problem assumed that the two parties share the same market information. We extend this problem by studying the situation in which the retailer has better market information than the manufacturer. Presented are several decision models that should be useful for guiding a manufacturer's decisions. Moreover, solutions to these models lead to various unexpected and interesting conclusions. For example, we found that improved retailer's market-knowledge always benefits the manufacturer and the system, though not necessarily the retailer himself. In contrast, improved manufacturer's knowledge benefits only the manufacturer himself at the expense of the retailer and of the system. © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ejoren_US
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean Journal of Operational Researchen_US
dc.subjectAsymmetric Informationen_US
dc.subjectInventoryen_US
dc.subjectNewsboy Problemen_US
dc.subjectPricingen_US
dc.titleSome two-echelon style-goods inventory models with asymmetric market informationen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailHingLing Lau, A: ahlau@business.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityHingLing Lau, A=rp01072en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0377-2217(00)00236-8en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0035480410en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0035480410&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume134en_US
dc.identifier.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.spage29en_US
dc.identifier.epage42en_US
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridHingLing Lau, A=7202626080en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLau, HS=7201497264en_US

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