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Article: On implementation via demand commitment games

TitleOn implementation via demand commitment games
Authors
KeywordsCore
Demand Commitment Game
Implementation
Shapley Value
Issue Date1998
PublisherPhysica-Verlag GmbH und Co. The Journal's web site is located at http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
Citation
International Journal Of Game Theory, 1998, v. 27 n. 2, p. 161-189 How to Cite?
AbstractA simple version of the Demand Commitment Game is shown to implement the Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for any n-person characteristic function game. This improves upon previous models devoted to this implementation problem in terms of one or more of the following: a) the range of characteristic function games addressed, b) the simplicity of the underlying noncooperative game (it is a finite horizon game where individuals make demands and form coalitions rather than make comprehensive allocation proposals and c) the general acceptability of the noncooperative equilibrium concept. A complete characterization of an equilibrium strategy generating the Shapley value outcomes is provided. Furthermore, for 3 player games, it is shown that the Demand Commitment Game can implement the core for games which need not be convex but have cores with nonempty interiors.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177706
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.577
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.878
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDasgupta, Aen_US
dc.contributor.authorChiu, YSen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:39:37Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:39:37Z-
dc.date.issued1998en_US
dc.identifier.citationInternational Journal Of Game Theory, 1998, v. 27 n. 2, p. 161-189en_US
dc.identifier.issn0020-7276en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177706-
dc.description.abstractA simple version of the Demand Commitment Game is shown to implement the Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for any n-person characteristic function game. This improves upon previous models devoted to this implementation problem in terms of one or more of the following: a) the range of characteristic function games addressed, b) the simplicity of the underlying noncooperative game (it is a finite horizon game where individuals make demands and form coalitions rather than make comprehensive allocation proposals and c) the general acceptability of the noncooperative equilibrium concept. A complete characterization of an equilibrium strategy generating the Shapley value outcomes is provided. Furthermore, for 3 player games, it is shown that the Demand Commitment Game can implement the core for games which need not be convex but have cores with nonempty interiors.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherPhysica-Verlag GmbH und Co. The Journal's web site is located at http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htmen_US
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Journal of Game Theoryen_US
dc.subjectCoreen_US
dc.subjectDemand Commitment Gameen_US
dc.subjectImplementationen_US
dc.subjectShapley Valueen_US
dc.titleOn implementation via demand commitment gamesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailChiu, YS: sywchiu@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityChiu, YS=rp01057en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s001820050064-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0040679716en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0040679716&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume27en_US
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.spage161en_US
dc.identifier.epage189en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000075882800001-
dc.publisher.placeGermanyen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridDasgupta, A=7202437260en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChiu, YS=7202775090en_US

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