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Article: Endogenous Sequencing in Strategic Trade Policy Games under Uncertainty

TitleEndogenous Sequencing in Strategic Trade Policy Games under Uncertainty
Authors
KeywordsCommitment
Endogenous Timing
Flexibility
Strategic Trade Policy
Issue Date1997
PublisherSpringer New York LLC. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=0923-7992
Citation
Open Economies Review, 1997, v. 8 n. 4, p. 353-369 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper examines a strategic trade policy game with endogenous timing. A trade-off between commitment and flexibility is identified. The equilibrium timing of trade policy decisions is shown to highly depend on the degree of demand uncertainty. When demand uncertainty is low, countervailing duties will never be used because the home government always sets its import tariff before the foreign government sets its export subsidy. When demand uncertainty reaches a threshold level, the home government starts to find it optimal to move second with positive probability. As a result, we provide an economic rationale for the prevailing use of countervailing duties in practice.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177669
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.772
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.531
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWong, KPen_US
dc.contributor.authorChow, KWen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:39:29Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:39:29Z-
dc.date.issued1997en_US
dc.identifier.citationOpen Economies Review, 1997, v. 8 n. 4, p. 353-369en_US
dc.identifier.issn0923-7992en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177669-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines a strategic trade policy game with endogenous timing. A trade-off between commitment and flexibility is identified. The equilibrium timing of trade policy decisions is shown to highly depend on the degree of demand uncertainty. When demand uncertainty is low, countervailing duties will never be used because the home government always sets its import tariff before the foreign government sets its export subsidy. When demand uncertainty reaches a threshold level, the home government starts to find it optimal to move second with positive probability. As a result, we provide an economic rationale for the prevailing use of countervailing duties in practice.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherSpringer New York LLC. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=0923-7992en_US
dc.relation.ispartofOpen Economies Reviewen_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.rightsThe original publication is available at www.springerlink.com-
dc.subjectCommitmenten_US
dc.subjectEndogenous Timingen_US
dc.subjectFlexibilityen_US
dc.subjectStrategic Trade Policyen_US
dc.titleEndogenous Sequencing in Strategic Trade Policy Games under Uncertaintyen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailWong, KP: kpwongc@hkucc.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityWong, KP=rp01112en_US
dc.description.naturepostprinten_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0031410814en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros36202-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0031410814&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume8en_US
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.spage353en_US
dc.identifier.epage369en_US
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridWong, KP=7404759417en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChow, KW=7202180874en_US

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