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Article: Noncooperative Bargaining, Hostages, and Optimal Asset Ownership

TitleNoncooperative Bargaining, Hostages, and Optimal Asset Ownership
Authors
Issue Date1998
PublisherAmerican Economic Association. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/index.php
Citation
American Economic Review, 1998, v. 88 n. 4, p. 882-901 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper reexamines the effect of asset ownership on investment decisions for a joint relationship in the absence of contracts on investment levels. It obtains some results which contradict findings by Grossman, Hart, and Moore. In particular, it finds that the loss of ownership of an asset may increase the asset loser's investment incentive. The difference between this paper and those authors' papers stems from the different interpretations of the roles of the threat point and outside options in bargaining. This paper also clarifies the role of relationship-specific investments as a cause of integration.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177636
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 3.833
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 8.048
SSRN
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChiu, YSen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:39:23Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:39:23Z-
dc.date.issued1998en_US
dc.identifier.citationAmerican Economic Review, 1998, v. 88 n. 4, p. 882-901en_US
dc.identifier.issn0002-8282en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177636-
dc.description.abstractThis paper reexamines the effect of asset ownership on investment decisions for a joint relationship in the absence of contracts on investment levels. It obtains some results which contradict findings by Grossman, Hart, and Moore. In particular, it finds that the loss of ownership of an asset may increase the asset loser's investment incentive. The difference between this paper and those authors' papers stems from the different interpretations of the roles of the threat point and outside options in bargaining. This paper also clarifies the role of relationship-specific investments as a cause of integration.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Association. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/index.phpen_US
dc.relation.ispartofAmerican Economic Reviewen_US
dc.titleNoncooperative Bargaining, Hostages, and Optimal Asset Ownershipen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailChiu, YS: sywchiu@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityChiu, YS=rp01057en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0000307458en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0000307458&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume88en_US
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.spage882en_US
dc.identifier.epage901en_US
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_US
dc.identifier.ssrn67508-
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChiu, YS=7202775090en_US

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