Pour une relecture du « grand jeu » entre l’Inde et la Chine en Birmanie

Abstract

Renewed by a military coup in September 1988, the Burmese junta is quickly ostracized by the international community during the 1990s. Only China maintained its links with Burma and extends its partnership with a new junta is trying to economic liberalization. Slow in reacting to the rapid Chinese penetration near the Gulf of Bengal, New Delhi then chooses to return to the Burmese strategic game in the 1990s, laying the groundwork to turn a cordial engagement with the Burmese generals. While Tibet and Pakistan are already two critical elements of the emerging Sino-Indian rivalry, Burma seems to become a new strategic issue in the bilateral relationship between Beijing and New Delhi at the end of the Cold War. A tide against this tenacious cliché, this analysis seeks to deconstruct the idea of ​​an all-round strategic competition unfolding between India and China in Burma, especially since the 2000s. If Beijing and New Delhi are now seeking to expand their influence in the region, it appears that this is more for reasons specific to each the result of a systematic attempt to thwart the ambitions of the other, and there to defeat the 'rival'. Burma, far axioms painting the country as a simple field strategic games between Indians and Chinese, also offers a lot of resistance to the thrust of its two larger neighbors.