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Article: Rejection of unfair offers can be driven by negative emotions, evidence from modified ultimatum games with anonymity

TitleRejection of unfair offers can be driven by negative emotions, evidence from modified ultimatum games with anonymity
Authors
Issue Date2012
PublisherPublic Library of Science. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.plosone.org/home.action
Citation
PLoS One, 2012, v. 7 n. 6, article no. e39619 How to Cite?
AbstractThe rejection of unfair offers can be affected by both negative emotions (e.g. anger and moral disgust) and deliberate cognitive processing of behavioral consequences (e.g. concerns of maintaining social fairness and protecting personal reputation). However, whether negative emotions are sufficient to motivate this behavior is still controversial. With modified ultimatum games, a recent study (Yamagishi T, et al. (2009) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 106:11520-11523) found that people reject unfair offers even when this behavior increases inequity, and even when they could not communicate to the proposers. Yamagishi suggested that rejection of unfair offers could occurr without people's concerning of maintaining social fairness, and could be driven by negative emotions. However, as anonymity was not sufficiently guaranteed in Yamagishi's study, the rejection rates in their experiments may have been influenced by people's concerns of protecting personal reputation (reputational concerns) in addition to negative emotions; thus, it was unclear whether the rejection was driven by negative emotions, or by reputational concerns, or both. In the present study, with specific methods to ensure anonymity, the effect of reputational concerns was successfully ruled out. We found that in a private situation in which rejection could not be driven by reputational concerns, the rejection rates of unfair offers were significantly larger than zero, and in public situations in which rejection rates could be influenced by both negative emotions and reputational concerns, rejection rates were significantly higher than that in the private situation. These results, together with Yamagishi's findings, provided more complete evidence suggesting (a) that the rejection of unfair offers can be driven by negative emotions and (b) that deliberate cognitive processing of the consequences of the behavior can increase the rejection rate, which may benefit social cooperation. © 2012 Ma et al.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/169104
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 3.057
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.395
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorMa, Nen_US
dc.contributor.authorLi, Nen_US
dc.contributor.authorHe, XSen_US
dc.contributor.authorSun, DLen_US
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Xen_US
dc.contributor.authorZhang, DRen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-08T03:41:51Z-
dc.date.available2012-10-08T03:41:51Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.citationPLoS One, 2012, v. 7 n. 6, article no. e39619en_US
dc.identifier.issn1932-6203en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/169104-
dc.description.abstractThe rejection of unfair offers can be affected by both negative emotions (e.g. anger and moral disgust) and deliberate cognitive processing of behavioral consequences (e.g. concerns of maintaining social fairness and protecting personal reputation). However, whether negative emotions are sufficient to motivate this behavior is still controversial. With modified ultimatum games, a recent study (Yamagishi T, et al. (2009) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 106:11520-11523) found that people reject unfair offers even when this behavior increases inequity, and even when they could not communicate to the proposers. Yamagishi suggested that rejection of unfair offers could occurr without people's concerning of maintaining social fairness, and could be driven by negative emotions. However, as anonymity was not sufficiently guaranteed in Yamagishi's study, the rejection rates in their experiments may have been influenced by people's concerns of protecting personal reputation (reputational concerns) in addition to negative emotions; thus, it was unclear whether the rejection was driven by negative emotions, or by reputational concerns, or both. In the present study, with specific methods to ensure anonymity, the effect of reputational concerns was successfully ruled out. We found that in a private situation in which rejection could not be driven by reputational concerns, the rejection rates of unfair offers were significantly larger than zero, and in public situations in which rejection rates could be influenced by both negative emotions and reputational concerns, rejection rates were significantly higher than that in the private situation. These results, together with Yamagishi's findings, provided more complete evidence suggesting (a) that the rejection of unfair offers can be driven by negative emotions and (b) that deliberate cognitive processing of the consequences of the behavior can increase the rejection rate, which may benefit social cooperation. © 2012 Ma et al.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherPublic Library of Science. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.plosone.org/home.actionen_US
dc.relation.ispartofPLoS ONEen_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleRejection of unfair offers can be driven by negative emotions, evidence from modified ultimatum games with anonymityen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailSun, DL:sundelin@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authoritySun, DL=rp00873en_US
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.doi10.1371/journal.pone.0039619en_US
dc.identifier.pmid22761845-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84862976259en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros243712-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-84862976259&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume7en_US
dc.identifier.issue6en_US
dc.identifier.spagearticle no. e39619-
dc.identifier.epagearticle no. e39619-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000305826400023-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridMa, N=35315879200en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLi, N=37661692800en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridHe, XS=42161192900en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridSun, DL=25029722800en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhang, X=7410268516en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhang, DR=7405356250en_US
dc.identifier.citeulike11864259-

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