File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: Modeling the commons as a game with vector payoffs

TitleModeling the commons as a game with vector payoffs
Authors
Keywordscommons
game theory
rationality
vector payoffs
Issue Date2012
PublisherSage Publications Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journal.aspx?pid=105694
Citation
Journal Of Theoretical Politics, 2012, v. 24 n. 1, p. 66-89 How to Cite?
AbstractSince Hardin first formulated the tragedy of the commons, researchers have described various ways that commons problems are solved, all based on the model of individual rationality. Invariably, these institutional solutions involve creating some system of property rights. We formulate an alternative model, one not founded on property rights but on decision-making around so-called vector payoffs. The model is formalized and an existence proof provided. The new model is shown to be effective in explaining some anomalous results (e.g., unanticipated cooperation) in the experimental games literature that run counter to the rational model. We then use the case of the buffalo commons to illustrate how the new model affords alternative explanations for examples like the rise and fall of the buffalo herds in the Great Plains. We find the vector payoff model to complement, though not displace, that of individual rationality. © The Author(s) 2011.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/167168
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.635
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.747
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLejano, RPen_HK
dc.contributor.authorIngram, Hen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-28T04:04:43Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-28T04:04:43Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_HK
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Theoretical Politics, 2012, v. 24 n. 1, p. 66-89en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0951-6298en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/167168-
dc.description.abstractSince Hardin first formulated the tragedy of the commons, researchers have described various ways that commons problems are solved, all based on the model of individual rationality. Invariably, these institutional solutions involve creating some system of property rights. We formulate an alternative model, one not founded on property rights but on decision-making around so-called vector payoffs. The model is formalized and an existence proof provided. The new model is shown to be effective in explaining some anomalous results (e.g., unanticipated cooperation) in the experimental games literature that run counter to the rational model. We then use the case of the buffalo commons to illustrate how the new model affords alternative explanations for examples like the rise and fall of the buffalo herds in the Great Plains. We find the vector payoff model to complement, though not displace, that of individual rationality. © The Author(s) 2011.en_HK
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherSage Publications Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journal.aspx?pid=105694en_HK
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Theoretical Politicsen_HK
dc.subjectcommonsen_HK
dc.subjectgame theoryen_HK
dc.subjectrationalityen_HK
dc.subjectvector payoffsen_HK
dc.titleModeling the commons as a game with vector payoffsen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.emailLejano, RP: lejano@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityLejano, RP=rp01666en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/0951629811423120en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-83255164160en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros222393-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-83255164160&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume24en_HK
dc.identifier.issue1en_HK
dc.identifier.spage66en_HK
dc.identifier.epage89en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000298002300004-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLejano, RP=6602298801en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridIngram, H=7004283258en_HK

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats