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Article: Optimal deadline for agreements

TitleOptimal deadline for agreements
Authors
Damiano, ELi, HSuen, WC
KeywordsInterdependent Values
Repeated Proposals
War Of Attrition
Issue Date2012
PublisherSociety for Economic Theory. The Journal's web site is located at http://econtheory.org
Citation
Theoretical Economics, 2012, v. 7 n. 2, p. 357-393 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE847
AbstractCostly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the end, or a deadlock, in which concessions end permanently. Extending the deadline hurts the players in the first case, but is beneficial in the second. When the initial conflict between the negotiating parties is intermediate, the optimal deadline is positive and finite, and is characterized by the shortest time that allows efficient information aggregation in equilibrium. © 2012 Ettore Damiano, Li, Hao, and Wing Suen.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/164716
ISSN
1933-6837
2021 Impact Factor: 1.671
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000304190800006

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDamiano, Een_US
dc.contributor.authorLi, Hen_US
dc.contributor.authorSuen, WCen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T08:08:42Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T08:08:42Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.citationTheoretical Economics, 2012, v. 7 n. 2, p. 357-393en_US
dc.identifier.issn1933-6837-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/164716-
dc.description.abstractCostly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the end, or a deadlock, in which concessions end permanently. Extending the deadline hurts the players in the first case, but is beneficial in the second. When the initial conflict between the negotiating parties is intermediate, the optimal deadline is positive and finite, and is characterized by the shortest time that allows efficient information aggregation in equilibrium. © 2012 Ettore Damiano, Li, Hao, and Wing Suen.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherSociety for Economic Theory. The Journal's web site is located at http://econtheory.org-
dc.relation.ispartofTheoretical Economicsen_US
dc.subjectInterdependent Values-
dc.subjectRepeated Proposals-
dc.subjectWar Of Attrition-
dc.titleOptimal deadline for agreementsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailSuen, WC: hrneswc@hkucc.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authoritySuen, WC=rp00066en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_OA_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.3982/TE847-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84862058178-
dc.identifier.hkuros206620en_US
dc.identifier.volume7en_US
dc.identifier.spage357en_US
dc.identifier.epage393en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000304190800006-
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridDamiano, E=9239291100-
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLi, H=55247524700-
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridSuen, W=7006977946-
dc.identifier.issnl1555-7561-

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