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<td>Steinhoff, U</td>
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Benbaji's ‘short answer’ goes like this (‘The War Convention’, pp. 598–9):

Natural moral rights, as construed in the Western political tradition, are exchangeable.... Here is a micro-level case in which basic moral rights are exchanged. Members of domestic societies have a right not to be attacked by others. By entering the ring, a boxer waives this right, and in return gains a right-privilege to attack his rival. \textit{Ex ante} (i.e., before the match) the convention which governs boxing is considered by both sides to be fair and mutually beneficial. This is why we can safely presume that the boxers accept it. The redistribution of rights within the boxing ring is not produced by \textit{explicit} agreement. Rather, it is generated by tacit acceptance of the rules, which is indicated by the combatants’ entering the ring.

Benbaji (p. 599) then applies this idea to states in the following way:

... decent states would seek an agreed system of rules to govern their future wars, prior to any armed conflict between them. I assume, and this is a crucial assumption, that international justice can be enforced only by self-help'; secondly, 'the armies provide'; thirdly, rules of war 'would be part of the \textit{in bello} agreement only if it could be known by the warring parties during the war whether these rules were being intentionally violated'.

A further assumption is this (pp. 600–1):

... it is in the interest of individuals who live in a world of sovereign and mutually suspicious states to be protected by a decent state which controls an obedient army. That is, soldiers (and their families, friends and fellow citizens) benefit from the in bello agreement because it makes national defence more efficient.

Relying on these assumptions, he comes (p. 601) to the following conclusion:

It is, then, tacit acceptance of the fair and mutually beneficial egalitarian law of war that generates the moral equality of soldiers: no combatant wrongs another, provided they all accept the convention.

Benbaji’s argument is fraught with problems. The most fundamental and indeed fatal one lies in his assumption, just quoted, that ‘combatants alienate their right not to be attacked by the unjust combatant’ by the ‘tacit acceptance of the fair and mutually beneficial egalitarian law of war’. He gives no justification either for his claim that the soldiers actually do tacitly accept the egalitarian law of war or for his claim that by this acceptance of the \textit{law} of war they alienate their moral right not to be attacked by unjust combatants. Both claims are implausible, and indeed wrong.

As regards the first claim, Benbaji is certainly wrong in claiming that by entering the ring the boxer automatically waives his legal right not to be hit by the other

\textbf{DISCUSSIONS}

\textbf{BENBAJI ON KILLING IN WAR AND ‘THE WAR CONVENTION’}

\textbf{BY UWE STEINHOFF}

Yitzhak Benbaji defends the view that soldiers on both the ‘just’ and the ‘unjust’ side in a war have the same liberty right to kill one another, because soldiers have ‘tacitly accepted’ the egalitarian laws of war and thereby waived their moral rights not to be attacked. I argue that soldiers on the ‘just’ side have not accepted the egalitarian laws of war; even if they had, they would not thereby have waived their moral rights not to be attacked. Moreover, the egalitarian laws of war and ‘the war convention’ are not fair and mutually beneficial, and so would not be accepted. Benbaji does not come to grips with the problem of the killing of civilians in war: his idea that states could waive the moral rights of their citizens is untenable.

Yitzhak Benbaji has criticized what he calls the ‘purist’ criticism of traditional just war theory. Others, like Jeff McMahan, call this ‘purism’ the ‘moral view’, as opposed to the ‘orthodox view’. This ‘moral view’ is that just and unjust combatants do not have the same liberty to kill each other. It also affects the distinction between \textit{jus ad bellum} and \textit{jus in bello} in so far as it alleges that unjust soldiers, that is, soldiers who do not have the \textit{jus ad bellum} on their side, cannot satisfy the \textit{in bello} proportionality requirement.\footnote{I argue elsewhere that actually they can. While the ‘moral view’ is correct in principle, that is, just and unjust soldiers do not in all wars have the liberty or moral permission to kill their opponents, in many or even most wars they do. Thus the scope of the ‘moral view’ is much more restricted than its defenders would like to think. See my \textit{On the Ethics of War and Terrorism} (Oxford UP, 2007), pp. 95–7; and Jeff McMahan on the ‘Moral Inequality of Combatants’, \textit{Journal of Political Philosophy}, 16 (2008), pp. 220–6.} Benbaji addresses these objections to the ‘orthodox view’, and seeks to prove with his ‘short answer’ to them ‘that the traditional notions of equality and proportionality employed in the traditional view form a perfectly consistent theory of \textit{jus in bello}’.


In a second step he then tries to deal with some ‘deeper worries regarding the ethical coherence of the traditional view’, which, however, do not concern me here.

In what follows I shall demonstrate that Benbaji’s attempt to save ‘the war convention’ fails.
So far I have tried to establish that soldiers do not tacitly consent to the laws of armed conflict, and that even if they did, this would not result in a 'redistribution of their rights'. I shall now argue that the laws of armed conflict are not fair and beneficial.

Why does Benbaji think they are? He explains (p. 600):

States guarantee post bellum immunity to enemy soldiers in order to secure post bellum immunity for their own soldiers. This agreement straightforwardly supports the obedience of their soldiers, and therefore enhances their power to protect their just claims. In a clear sense, then, the legal equality of soldiers is an element of a fair contract.

He also claims (p. 599) that only this legal equality can meet the enforceability requirement stating that rules of war ‘would be part of the in bello agreement only if it could be known by the warring parties during the war whether these rules were being intentionally violated’. Thus according to him ‘the objective of the contracting parties is minimizing the harm inflicted on morally innocent people within wars, without limiting the right states have to use force in protecting their just claims’.

What he overlooks, however, is that these goals conflict. In many if not in most wars it is impossible to minimize the harm inflicted on morally innocent people without limiting the right states have to use force in protecting their just claims. But this precisely means nothing less than that limiting the right to use force which states have might be a way to protect innocent people. In the same vein, Benbaji is mistaken when he claims (p. 601) that ‘soldiers (and their families, friends and fellow citizens) benefit from the in bello agreement because it makes national defence more efficient’.

People might benefit much more when enemy states are less efficient in waging wars.

Here is an example at the domestic level. People have a right to defend themselves. If they are not allowed to carry machine-guns, flamethrowers, hand grenades and perhaps a fair amount of poisonous gas around with them, the efficiency of their self-defensive measures will be undermined. After all, if you are attacked by a group of gangsters, a flamethrower or a poison gas grenade might come in handy. Obviously, however, if other people also start running around heavily armed, this will definitely be a severe blow to your own security. Even if you are not directly targeted, the chances that you may become the ‘collateral’ victim of other people’s self-defence against an aggressor, or what they perceive to be an aggressor, would be significantly heightened.

The application to war is obvious. Being surrounded by a bunch of states which have obedient soldiers who are willing blindly to follow orders to invade other countries, and who are labouring under the assumption that the attacked people have waived their rights not to be attacked by them, certainly will seriously undermine your security, even (or perhaps especially) if your own state can count on the equally blind obedience of your own soldiers. Thus even if there were good moral and pragmatic reasons not to legally sanction soldiers for violations of the jus ad bellum (how good those reasons are is open to debate), there are still very good reasons for having laws of armed conflict which outlaw participation in unjust
The war convention promotes injustice, since it permits (and thus legitimizes) killing innocent people for no good reason. After all, were soldiers required to justify the war in which they participate in a national or an international court, the number of unjust wars would be reduced. So the alternative norms which purists envisage are superior to the traditional norms, even from the standpoint of moderated morality.

Benbaji does not say that the ‘purists’ are wrong in their assessment (and in my view they are right, for precisely the reasons he adduces). Yet he thinks (ibid.) that nevertheless ‘the current norm is not indecent or egregiously immoral’. But this is a surprising statement given Benbaji’s concession. After all, one would tend to think that if anything is indecent and egregiously immoral, it is a convention that ‘promotes injustice, since it permits (and thus legitimizes) killing innocent people for no good reason’.

Another defence he offers is the following:

Thus, suppose that, within the optimal institutional arrangement, soldiers would be legally unequal. Even then the outcome produced by the current egalitarian legislation might be a ‘suboptimal co-operative equilibrium’: although a better outcome might be imagined, no one would be better off had he alone followed another rule. Currently, the general acceptance of the egalitarian convention is, in this weak sense, mutually beneficial.4

Slavery is also, in a world where slavery is accepted, ‘mutually beneficial’ in this ‘weak sense’: no one gains anything from being the only one who does not accept the permissibility of slavery. Obviously, then, the fact that something is ‘mutually beneficial’ in a ‘weak sense’ does not speak to its legitimacy. Finally, general acceptance of the egalitarian convention is actually not even ‘in the weak sense’ mutually beneficial. If a very powerful but peaceful state holds soldiers of states who are unjustly attacking it legally accountable for their jus ad bellum violations, this is a strong disincentive from further attacks and thus enhances the security of this powerful and peaceful state.

Thus the war convention as Benbaji understands it is not mutually beneficial, either in the irrelevant ‘weak sense’, or, as Benbaji seems to admit, in the relevant literal sense. Consequently his ‘contractualist’ argument for the moral equality of soldiers collapses.

As regards the fairness condition, Benbaji again himself mentions (ibid.) a powerful objection, but dismisses it without any serious argument:

It might be thought that the egalitarian convention does not benefit members of military forces who protect a state that is very unlikely to engage in unjust aggressive

Secondly, the difficulties with the concept of ‘tacit consent’ are notorious. As many authors have pointed out from Hume onwards, the mere fact that people are residing in a state can hardly be construed as ‘tacit consent’ to its norms.

Thirdly, as already stated, the legal in bello contract does not comprise the moral equality of combatants. States have nowhere said that soldiers of other states do not violate the moral rights of innocent civilians if they shoot them or blow them up. Thus the state has not negotiated away the rights of its civilians not to be unjustly attacked by enemy soldiers in any case, and thus the civilians have not consented to such abdications of their rights, neither tacitly nor explicitly.

Fourthly, babies cannot consent to anything. Soldiers who unjustly kill them would thus violate their rights even if one granted that adults have tacitly consented to the waiving of their moral right not to be unjustly killed by enemy soldiers.

Fifthly, many people explicitly state that they have a right not to be unjustly killed by enemy soldiers. Such an explicit statement, it seems, should override any presumed ‘tacit consent’.

Sixthly, even if one granted for the sake of argument that the explicit statement does not override tacit consent, it is still clear that citizens fighting against the state can hardly be considered to have tacitly authorized the state to negotiate away their rights. Indeed, they make it very clear through their rebellion or resistance that they reject the state’s authority, both tacitly and explicitly. Thus if incumbents unjustly suppress a guerrilla movement and its followers, they would violate the rights of innocent guerrilla fighters and civilians. The same would be true of an external force trying to help the incumbents. Furthermore, if a guerrilla movement overthrows the state and founds a new state which criticizes as filthy imperialists and ruthless murderers the powers unjustly trying to intervene and to re-establish the old order, and which rejects the legal jus in bello in cases of anti-imperialist struggles, then the anti-imperialist soldiers and civilians completely retain their rights not to be killed by the imperialist soldiers, for the new state quite explicitly has not negotiated away those rights.

Seventhly, and rather importantly, the whole idea that states are somehow authorized, tacitly or expressly, to waive rights of their citizens with regard to agents of other states is certainly not part of the (liberal) Western tradition. If it were, something would be seriously wrong with that tradition. Suppose two states have a problem with a deadly epidemic disease. In order to find a cure as quickly as possible, human experiments are required. While it is clear that these experiments would kill most of the human subjects, it is also as good as certain that many more people could be saved by these experiments. Both states want to join forces. Neither state, however, wants its own scientists to conduct experiments on their own citizens. Thus they officially waive the rights of their citizens not to be abducted and experimented upon by the agents of the other state. An additional agreement stipulates that not more than 100 persons are to be abducted per month. The contract is ex ante mutually beneficial and fair. Thus according to Benbaji, given this contract, not only would the agents of state A be morally permitted to abduct and to experiment upon citizens of state B, but these citizens would also be morally prohibited from defending themselves against near certain death — for they no longer have the right not to be abducted and used for deadly medical experiments. Again I consider this to be a reductio ad absurdum of Benbaji’s account. States simply do not have the power to waive moral rights of their citizens.

Thus Benbaji’s ‘short answer’ is profoundly mistaken, for a whole battery of reasons. Neither soldiers nor citizens have waived their moral right not to be unjustly killed by enemy soldiers. His ‘long answer’ does not provide any further arguments which could undermine this result. Rather, it seems to address a completely different issue.

I conclude that Benbaji’s attempt to save ‘the war convention’, understood as a convention which grants soldiers on both just and unjust sides alike an equal moral liberty right to kill each other, fails.