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<td><strong>Author(s)</strong></td>
<td>Hualing, F</td>
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Re-education through Labour in Historical Perspective*

Fu Hualing

ABSTRACT Re-education through labour (laodong jiaoyang or laojiao for short) is an administrative punishment imposed by the police. Since its inception in 1955, it has become a convenient instrument for the government to use to deal with any crisis. Its development has largely followed the ebb and flow of the CCP’s political behaviour. Created as a comparatively mild suppression of counterrevolutionary activities, laojiao served as a useful instrument of punishment for dissenting intellectuals in 1958, though it was then nearly phased out during the radical years of the Cultural Revolution. Laojiao expanded quickly as a result of the CCP’s anti-crime strategy after 1983, and has grown steadily ever since. It now serves multiple functions, including crime control, drug rehabilitation, investigative detention and political control. It enjoys different degrees of legitimacy and justification. Any substantive discussion on the future of laojiao has to be offence and offender specific.

Laodong jiaoyang or laojiao for short (re-education through labour, hereafter laojiao) is an administrative punishment imposed by the police according to laws, regulations or policies, under which the police can bypass the criminal process and summarily subject a person guilty of “minor offences” to a maximum of three years’ incarceration. Laojiao was created in 1955 in response to the campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries hidden in government departments. As a result of the cumulative effect of the political and social control in China, laojiao has over the decades become a convenient instrument for the government to deal with whatever crisis it faces.

Punishment in China has generally received little academic attention. According to the Chinese orthodox penology, punishment transforms prisoners, and thus is a means to achieve the reform and rehabilitation of offenders. The reform process takes place through collective labour, by which the planned penal economy makes a significant contribution to the state economy.² For critics of the Chinese government, such punishment is as politically repressive as it is financially lucrative, and is a means by which the state silences dissenting voices and extracts surplus for its

* The author would like to thank Nicolas Becquelin, D W Choy, He Weifang, Lison Harris, Randy Peerenboom, Sophia Woodman and Zhu Suli for their constructive comments on earlier versions of this article.

1. There are two principal types of imprisonment in China: laogai and laojiao. Laogai, or laodong gaizao (reform through labour), is a punishment rendered by a court after trial according to provisions of the Criminal Law. Laojiao on the contrary is an administrative punishment rendered by the police.


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economic development. Punishment is thus little more than state repression. Increasingly, researchers take a more nuanced approach to punishment in China. While taking the rehabilitative ideology seriously in assessing punishment in China, they nevertheless put the ideology into the political, financial and institutional context, and try to examine how political and financial constraints effectively defeat the reformist agenda. They point to the multiple functions punishment serves in China.

Since the mid-1990s, laojiao has attracted serious attention from Chinese legal academics, government officials and international human rights organizations. But in the debate over its future, laojiao is generally treated as a single unit, an overarching category, with its internal complexity often overlooked. This article therefore calls for a nuanced approach to laojiao and its possible future reform. The principal arguments of the article are, first, that the primary function of laojiao has shifted from political control to the prevention and punishment of minor offences, and secondly, that laojiao serves multiple functions, with varying degrees of legitimacy and justification. As itpunishes a variety of people on different legal and moral grounds, any substantive discussion on its future has to be offence and offender specific.

This article is divided into two parts. The first part is a narrative account of the historical development of laojiao, including its primary target, scope of application, and underlying social and political context, followed by an illustration of how laojiao has grown in size since its establishment. The second part examines in some detail the four functions laojiao serves: crime control, political control, investigative detention and drug rehabilitation.

7. The article relies principally on Chinese published sources. Some are first-hand, particularly direct data from laojiao institutions; and others are secondary, including investigative reports by practitioners and academics. Of special interest is the official journal of the Crime Prevention Research Institute of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), *Fanzui yu gaizao yanjiu* (*Studies on Crime and Reform*). Most of its articles are by officers working in penal institutions in China, thus providing the most detailed (and often critical) comments of their institutions. I tried to verify the credibility of the sources: first, I cross-checked by comparing publications by practitioners and academics, and publications from different institutions; secondly, I interviewed police officers in charge of laojiao intake, procurators with a supervisory role during the process and laojiao officers who manage laojiao institutions; finally, I compared the secondary sources with data from my field studies in a laojiao institution in Southern China (see Fu Hualing, “Punishing for profit”). I don’t take the reports and commentaries from China at their face value. But a more serious problem is the lack of systemic information on this unique aspect of China’s criminal justice system.
The Development of Laojiao

A period of formation and expansion. In 1955, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) started a campaign to uncover hidden counterrevolutionaries within the Party and government institutions, state enterprises, schools and urban communities. A mandatory quota of 5 per cent of government employees were set to be purged in the campaign. After the campaign, which lasted for more than a year, about 100,000 hidden counterrevolutionaries and “bad elements” were identified.

The CCP employed a number of methods of dealing with the people purged in the campaign, including laojiao. According to the 1955 CCP Directive:

The counterrevolutionaries and other bad elements who are uncovered during this campaign, except those who were sentenced to death and those who retain their posts because of the minor nature of their offence, complete confession or meritorious performance, will be handled in one of two ways. One method is reform through labour after their conviction. The other method is re-education through labour which should be applied to those who cannot be convicted and sentenced, who are not politically reliable and thus cannot retain their posts, and who would increase the burden of unemployment if released to society … They should be gathered together to work for the state and be paid by the state.

This 1955 Directive clearly limited the application of laojiao to those people who were not convicted of a criminal offence, because their offence was so minor that it did not warrant a criminal penalty. But in 1956, the CCP issued a more detailed guideline for the establishment of laojiao, which said that it could also be applied to those who had committed minor criminal offences and had been sentenced to control (guanzhi), that is, police supervision in the community.

Laojiao was punitive from the beginning. Under it, offenders were gathered together and sent to designated places to work. While the government tried to argue that it was a form of penal welfarism, as each offender received a salary from the state and was only partially deprived of freedom, laojiao was commonly referred to as “quasi-imprisonment,” and in practice treated by the government as imprisonment. In some provinces, laojiao offenders were attached to prisons in sub-units. Even in provinces where separate laojiao institutions existed, they could not

effectively be distinguished from imprisonment. Both were built in remote rural areas and offenders were required to reclaim land and work on farmland under the close supervision of the police.\(^\text{12}\) Notwithstanding the CCP’s efforts to distinguish laojiao from criminal punishment, the laojiao population and convicted criminal offenders were incarcerated and treated in the same way.\(^\text{13}\) The history of laojiao therefore reflects the historical development of criminal punishment in China in general.\(^\text{14}\)

The year 1957 was important in the history of laojiao. The State Council enacted the Decision on Laojiao (1957 Decision),\(^\text{15}\) which remains the principal authorizing legal document. The 1957 Decision was based on two recommendations made by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) to the CCP Central Committee to enlarge the scope of laojiao,\(^\text{16}\) and both laid the foundation for laojiao and clarified its scope of application. The State Council Decision coincided with one of the largest political campaigns in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the anti-rightist campaign, which used laojiao extensively against intellectuals who aired opinions critical of the CCP. The 1957 Decision expanded the categories of eligible offenders to those who, without proper employment, repeatedly engaged in minor offences; minor counterrevolutionaries; former state employees who were expelled and could not make a living; and employees who did not obey job assignments and repeatedly caused disturbance at work places.\(^\text{17}\)

In addition to these four types of persons, the MPS, with the endorsement of the CCP Central Committee, extended laojiao to habitual offenders who were released from imprisonment and who had committed “activities endangering public order,” and prostitutes who refused to mend their ways after repeated admonition or who were homeless.\(^\text{18}\)

Under the 1957 Decision and police internal rules, the focus was shifting from suppressing the regime’s actual or perceived enemies to disciplining the work force and creating docile workers. The Decision clearly provided that laojiao, as a “mechanism for employment arrangement” is “to reform those persons with the capacity to labour, who loaf, violate law and discipline, or who do not engage in proper employment, ...


into self-supporting new persons.” 19 While the target population might have shifted from hidden counterrevolutionaries in 1955 to idlers in 1957, the underlying rationale remained to remove them from the rest of the society and force them to live by their own labour. 20 As an editorial in *Renmin ribao* (*People’s Daily*) stated at the time, the anti-socialist and anti-social elements would be forced both to make a living and to reform themselves through their own labour. 21

Nevertheless, *laojiao* continued to target political offenders. The enactment of the 1957 Decision was immediately followed by the launching of the anti-rightist campaign. This campaign targeted intellectuals in academic institutions in particular, and it is estimated that more than half a million individuals, mostly intellectuals, were purged. Again, people were subjected to different treatment according to the severity of their “mistakes,” with *laojiao* as the most severe form of punishment. 22

Statistics from the Shandong First *Laojiao* Institution reflected the mixture of offenders in *laojiao* from 1957 to 1960, as shown in Table 1. Given the high percentage of rightists among the new *laojiao* population, it is not surprising that 10,351 offenders (or 62 per cent) were employed before the penalty was applied, and were comparatively old: 12,138

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Table 1: **Inmates in Shandong First Laojiao Institution 1957–1960**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of offenders</th>
<th>No. of offenders</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political offenders</td>
<td>9,858</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterrevolutionaries</td>
<td>4,878</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rightists</td>
<td>2,517</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactionaries</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary offenders</td>
<td>5,479</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>3,346</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deception</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hooliganism</td>
<td>1,938</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1,358</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total offenders</td>
<td>16,695</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:*

All political offenders were incarcerated in the Shangdong First *Laojiao* Institution. Since the total *laojiao* population was 22,784 at that time in the province, the percentage of political offenders in the total *laojiao* population was 44%. Ministry of Justice Project on the Nature of *laojiao*, “Lun laodong jiaoyang de xingzhi wenti” (“On the nature of *laojiao*”), *Fanzui yu gaizao yanjiu*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1990), p. 11.

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19. The 1957 Decision.


22. Chen Ruihua, “Historical exploration.”
The expanded use of laojiao and the anti-rightist campaign contributed to the increasing abuse of laojiao. Laojiao institutions were extended to the local level of government. In rural areas, for example, counties and communes started to set up their own laojiao institutions to incarcerate people the local authorities regarded as deviants, loafers in particular. Many of the efforts were results of local initiatives (minban), without government authorization or sponsorship. The expansion of laojiao must be seen in the larger context of socio-economic change during the Great Leap Forward, which affected not only industry and agriculture but also the penal sector. In Xinjian Uighur Autonomous Region, for example, there were only 12 penal institutions in 1952, but 152 by the end of 1958.

Industrial enterprises also abused the system by sending unwanted workers to laojiao, and effectively made laojiao a place where factories could dump undisciplined workers. Because it was not regarded as a punishment, applications could be made by government departments, employers, heads of family or guardians. The period of incarceration for laojiao was indefinite, and inmates naturally accumulated in the institutions. In Anhui province, for example, about 14,000 persons were incarcerated in laojiao institutions in 1957 and the number soared to 51,000 by the end of 1960. At the national level, the laojiao population reached 499,523.

A period of caution and decline. Abuse of laojiao following the anti-rightist movement appears to have reached such a level that it became impossible to manage the system. As a result, in the early 1960s the government started to control the expansion of laojiao. In 1961, the MPS, with the approval of the CCP Central Committee, passed new rules to limit the use of laojiao, prohibiting its use for workers who merely refused to work. Laojiao was no longer designed to prepare

23. MoJ Project on the Nature of Laojiao, “Lun laodong jiaoyang de xingzhi wenti” (“On the nature of laojiao”), Fanzui yu gaizao yanjiu, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1990), p. 9. This is said to be the only local laojiao data known to the MoJ researchers.
28. The 1957 Decision, s. 3.
31. MPS, “Guanyu dangqian gong’an gongzuou shi ge juti zhengce wenti de buchong guiding” (“Supplementary measures on the ten concrete policy questions in contemporary
“undesirables” for employment and to provide social welfare. In particular, the new rules were aimed at restraining government departments or enterprises from abusing the system by sending undisciplined or otherwise unwanted workers to laojiao institutions. It was now required that any government department, institute or factory that sent one of its employees to laojiao was obliged to keep the employee’s position open, pay the salary during the period of incarceration and take back that individual as an employee after release. As Ministry of Justice (MoJ) researchers noted, the restrictions significantly reduced the number of laojiao offenders coming from government institutions. Procedurally, the MPS expressly prohibited the establishment of any laojiao institutions at or below the county level.

Another significant development limited the term of laojiao to between two and three years. The decision regarding the term of punishment was announced only to the offenders and their families, not publicly. Offenders with good performance during incarceration might have their term shortened while those with unsatisfactory performance might have it extended. The police continued to be responsible for job placement for those released from laojiao, and to provide employment opportunities within the laojiao institutions where no job opportunities were available and where the offenders agreed. The combined effect of the normative change and the winding up of the anti-rightist campaign naturally led to a decline in the intake number, the laojiao population and laojiao institutions. The percentage of political offenders declined, accompanied by a surge of inmates who had committed ordinary criminal offences. The type of offenders in the Shandong First Laojiao Institution from 1961 to 1965 reflected the result of the policy changes (see Table 2).

Table 2: Inmates in Shandong First Laojiao Institution 1961–1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of offenders</th>
<th>No. of offenders</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political offenders</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary offenders</td>
<td>5,763</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Offenders</td>
<td>7,439</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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footnote continued

34. According to my interviews with laojiao offenders in Changsha in 2003, they were often not released in time.
35. Xinjiang Laojiao Bureau, “History of laojiao work in Xinjiang.”
The information available on the operation of laojiao during the Cultural Revolution tends to claim that it was in a status of near suspension, largely because its rehabilitation ideology was criticized as being soft on the enemy or even “aiding the enemy.”37 By 1969, there were only about 5,000 laojiao inmates left in the whole country, and redundant laojiao officers had to be transferred to other institutions. Laojiao only entered into a new era after 1978.38

Studies on local laojiao portray a more complicated picture, although these studies confirm the overall declining use of laojiao during the Cultural Revolution. In 1971, the central government started to restore order in Chinese cities. One of the measures taken was to restore laojiao. In Tianjin city, for example, the government enacted a provisional rule on laojiao, converting a farm into its No. 1 Laojiao Institution in 1971, and a cadre-training school into its No. 2 Laojiao Institution in 1972.39

A period of restoration, growth and rationalization. The first official sign of the restoration of laojiao was an enactment of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 1979 approving the State Council Supplementary Rules on Laojiao.40 These rules provided that:

a. A laojiao administration was to be set up in governments at the provincial level or governments of large or medium sized cities;
b. The laojiao administration was to be composed of members from the civil administration, police and labour department;
c. Laojiao was to apply to people from “large and medium sized cities”; and
d. The time of incarceration was limited to three years, with a possible one-year extension.

In 1980, a State Council Notice incorporated both “forced labour”41 and “shelter and interrogation”42 into laojiao, introducing a preventative

37. For a similar attack on the imprisonment during the same period, see Wang Mingdi and Guo Jianan, History Remembers.
41. This was created by the police in the early 1960s to deal with minor offenders. Instead of sending a minor offender to a laojiao institution, a police station might set up a separate forced labour brigade, in which suspects were gathered to work. China Laogai Research Committee, Zhongguo laogaixue da cidian (Dictionary of Laogai) (Beijing: Social Science Literature Press, 1993), p. 674.
42. This began as a police initiative for the control of urban transients. By the mid-1970s, the police declared that it would become a crime control mechanism involving compulsory examination of certain suspects. The police resorted to shelter and interrogation to circumvent regular criminal procedures. It was abolished in 1996 when the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) was amended. See K C Wong, “Police powers and control in the People’s Republic of China: the history of shoushen,” Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 10 (1996), p. 367–390.
element into the punitive instrument to apply to persons who were suspected of having committed certain offences.\textsuperscript{43} In 1982, the MPS further shifted the focus of \textit{laojiao} to offenders who committed minor criminal offences. As a result, its punitive nature became more expressed: \textit{laojiao} was to provide a compulsory measure of education and reform (as in the 1957 Decision), and a measure to handle “contradictions among the people.” It was no longer regarded as “a measure for employment arrangement.”

The government used \textit{laojiao} to target a new group of offenders. The figures from Shandong First \textit{Laojiao} Institution are again illustrative of this trend. In 1980, there were 1,215 offenders. Only one was classified as a political offender and vast majority (90 per cent) had committed the offences of theft, fighting in public or deception. The new \textit{laojiao} population was also much younger. Among these 1,215 offenders, 917 were between 17 and 25, 233 were between 25 and 36 and only 36 were over the age of 36. Finally, the vast majority of the \textit{laojiao} population was of urban residence: only 37 out of the 1,215 were classified as peasants.\textsuperscript{44}

Yet despite the change toward using \textit{laojiao} as a punitive measure against juvenile and young offenders, the ideology of penal welfarism was not abandoned in the early 1980s. The rehabilitative ideology was even reinforced precisely because the new \textit{laojiao} offenders were from a working class background, and could and should be re-educated and saved. It was indeed a shock to the CCP leaders that their prisons were not filled with their “enemy” but with their own people. Given the change of the target population, from 1980 to 1982 the CCP initiated a series of rehabilitative policies and programmes in both the reform through labour and \textit{laojiao} institutions to educate, reform and rescue juvenile offenders. One of most popular policies was the “three likes.”\textsuperscript{45}

Since 1983, the government has also rationalized the management of \textit{laojiao} by creating institutional checks and balances. The police came out of the Cultural Revolution as an extremely powerful institution, and the central government was determined to weaken that power.\textsuperscript{46} In May 1983,
penal institutions, including laojiao, were separated from the police and transferred to the MoJ. The police continued to be in charge of laojiao intake, but the operation of the institutions became the responsibility of MoJ or its subordinate departments at the provincial or sub-provincial levels. Another important institutional change occurred in 1988 when laojiao was finally separated from the prison administration at the provincial level. This separation gave laojiao a distinct identity for the first time, which was enhanced when the MoJ initiated a series of rehabilitative policies and programmes to distinguish laojiao from criminal punishment.

There were indications in the late 1990s that the government’s determination to reform laojiao was substantially a result of domestic and international pressure. China’s decision to participate in the international community of human rights (indicated by its accession to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) has also invited more international scrutiny of its human rights performance. China signed an agreement with the UN Human Rights Commission on improving human rights, with a focus on the future of laojiao.

The laojiao expansion. The explosive growth of legislation in China since 1979 has included a steady increase in eligible laojiao offences. Throughout the 1980s, various law-making bodies at the central and regional levels have authorized the further use of laojiao for numerous offences, including: contacting intelligence agencies in Taiwan (1981); unauthorized removal of IUD for profit (1983); unlawful cohabitation by a married person (1983); membership in cults or secret societies (1983); illegal deforesting (1985); repeated ticket scalping (1986); repeated prostitution and gambling (1986); publishing obscene and indecent materials (1986); unlawful purchase, smuggling or selling gold (1987); barricading railways (1989); and drug-taking (1991). Apparently none of the latter regulations, rules or

47. This police power is delegated by the provincial laojiao administrations. MPS and MoJ, “Guanyu laodong jiaoyang he zhuxiao laojiao renyuan chengshi hukou wenti de tongzhi” (“Notice on laojiao and the cancellation of urban registration of laojiao offenders”) (26 March 1984), in Editorial Committee, Collection of Laws on Public Security, p. 1331.
notices overruled or replaced previous ones. To aggravate the situation, regional authorities also enacted local rules to expand the scope of offences eligible for *laojiao*. One province, for example, extended it to dumping rubbish on roads and even to transients without proper identification.\(^51\)

The *laojiao* regulations accumulated and the categories of eligible offences and offenders naturally increased. Although there have been different estimates of the number of offences that are eligible for *laojiao*, the consensus among police researchers and officers is that *laojiao* is elastic enough to include most, if not all, offences. Given the lack of external accountability, nothing stops the police from imposing *laojiao* for an offence, even without clear legal authorization.\(^52\) In 2002, the MPS enacted a new rule to regulate and rationalize the police use of *laojiao*.\(^53\) Yet the new rule continues the application of *laojiao* to whatever eligible offences that have been authorized by laws, regulations and policies.

The geographical areas in which *laojiao* applies have also expanded once more. When it was created, *laojiao* applied only to people holding government posts in the cities. From 1957, it began to be applied in both cities and rural areas. In the late 1970s, *laojiao* was again limited to cities. But since then, it has gradually been extended to rural areas. *Laojiao* is generally applicable to all people, regardless of their residential status, who have committed prostitution, pornography and gambling related offences, all drug addicts, and habitual prostitutes. It is also applicable to “rural ruffians, hooligans and village rogues.”\(^54\) There is no geographic limitation in the 2002 MPS rule on *laojiao*.\(^55\) The annual *laojiao* population as a result has also expanded throughout the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 3).

\(^{51}\) See Liu Zhongfa, “Laodong jiaoyang shiyong duixiang zhi lifa pingxi yu lifa wanshan” (“Legislative comments on and improvement to the eligible *laojiao* targets”), *Fujian gong’an gaodeng zhuanye xuexiao xueba*: *shehui gonggong anquan yanjiu* (Journal of the Fujian Public Security College: Social and Public Safety Research), Vol. 14, No. 4 (2000), pp. 37–41. Of course, police in each province have made their own internal rules to guide the application of *laojiao*.


\(^{53}\) MPS, “Gong’an jiguan banli laodong jiaoyang anjian guiding” (“Measures regarding the handling of *laojiao* cases by public security organs”) (12 April 2002) (hereafter “the 2002 Measures”) (on file with the author).

\(^{54}\) But *laojiao* is not applicable to “foreigners, overseas Chinese and compatriots from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.” MPS, “Guanyu dui waiguoren he huaqiao, Gang Ao Tai tongbao bude shixing shourong shengcha he laodong jiaoyang tongzhi” (“Notice on prohibiting the use of shelter and interrogation and *laojiao* on foreigners, overseas Chinese, and compatriots from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan”) (27 May 1992), in Editorial Committee, *Collection of Laws on Public Security*, p. 1381. This prohibition is confirmed in the new 2002 Measures. The 2002 Measures, s. 12.

\(^{55}\) The new MPS rule does impose limitations on the use of *laojiao* on juveniles under 16 and first-time offenders. The 2002 Measures, ss. 9, 10 and 12.
Table 3: *Laojiao Population from 1958 to 1999*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of laojiao institutions</th>
<th>No. of inmates admitted inmates</th>
<th>No. of newly admitted inmates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>355,777</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>435,325</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>499,523</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>396,133</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>186,765</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>143,373</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100,566</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>64,453</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>39,616</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4,798</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6,623</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>13,203</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>37,083</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>70,233</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>204,170</td>
<td>86,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>163,574</td>
<td>54,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>129,330</td>
<td>74,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>139,412</td>
<td>80,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
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Sources:
The Functions of Laojiao

Laojiao as crime control. Laojiao has supplemented criminal sanctions by punishing minor offences, the consequences or the circumstances of which are not serious enough to trigger the criminal law. First, laojiao targets migrants, especially rural migrants, for minor violations of the law. Rural migrants commit the majority of the crimes in Chinese cities and have become an easy target for severe punishment. Secondly, laojiao targets habitual minor offenders.

The problem of targeting rural migrants in the city is aggravated by the extension of laojiao to rural areas. As mentioned above, since the mid-1980s, the law began to expand the use of laojiao to certain limited offences committed in rural areas, largely in response to the increase in crimes committed by rural populations in both urban and rural areas. The MPS has been cautious not to extend laojiao to rural areas and has actually turned down such requests from provincial police. Since the late 1990s, however, laojiao no longer has any serious geographic limit. As a result, the rural population in laojiao institutions has soared, accounting for as much as 70 per cent of the total.

Secondly, laojiao also serves a crime control function by punishing habitual minor offenders, that is, offenders with a record of previous criminal convictions, laojiao or other administrative penalties. Such a record can prove to be crucial. A minor offence normally results in a fine or other lesser administrative penalty if committed by a person without a prior record, but if committed by a person with a record it may lead to a lengthy laojiao sanction. Officially, the average national percentage of repeat offenders in laojiao institutions is about 30 per cent; although it could be 50 or 60 per cent in some provinces. Some local studies put habitual offenders as high as 75 per cent.

Moreover, laojiao exerts a broader control by punishing harmful or immoral acts. For example, it enforces family planning by punishing doctors who remove IUDs without authorization; it reinforces certain family values by punishing adultery; it maintains order in penal institutions by punishing inmates who maim themselves; it maintains railway transportation by punishing people who walk or sit on railways or

56. For example, the MPS declined a request from Hainan police to impose laojiao on rural residents who repeatedly commit minor offences in rural areas. Legal Department of MPS, “Dui Hainansheng gonganting ‘Guanyu jiaju, nongcun, duoci zuo’an, shangbugou zhuijiu xingshi zeren de weifa renyuan keyi shourong laodong jiaoyang de qingshi’ de pufu” (“Reply to ‘request by Hainan Police Department regarding the use of laojiao on persons of rural residents who have repeatedly committed offences which do not warrant criminal punishment’ ”) (7 June 1990), in Editorial Committee, Collection of Laws on Public Security, p. 1351.
otherwise interrupt the smooth passage of trains; and it punishes laid-off employees who repeatedly petition government officials in disruptive ways. In sum, it is used as a key device to maintain social order and stability.59

Laojiao targets primarily male offenders. Over the years, the absolute number and the percentage of females in the laojiao population have declined. Before 1999, most were incarcerated for prostitution, which had replaced fighting in public and theft which accounted for the highest number in the late 1970s and early 1980s.60 An important change occurred in 1999 when the police took over the re-education of prostitutes by setting up women’s shelters and education centres in large and medium sized cities. As a result, prostitutes were diverted to the police-run shelters, and the percentage of prostitutes in laojiao declined.61 After this, women in laojiao tended to be those who organized prostitution rather than those who were directly engaging in it.62

Laojiao as a drug control measure. Laojiao has been one of the principal ways of dealing with China’s serious drug problem.63 The 1990 Decision on the Prohibition of Drugs passed by the NPC Standing Committee authorizes the use of laojiao for addicts who continue to use drugs after being subjected to the police-run compulsory drug treatment programme. Since 1990, the number of drug addicts in laojiao institutions and their percentage in the total inmates have soared. According to a MoJ study of 21 provinces in 1997, drug users accounted for about 84 per cent of the laojiao population in Gansu, 71 per cent in Yunnan, 65 per cent in Qinghai, 63 per cent in Inner Mongolia, 59 per cent in Shanxi, 42 per cent in Shaanxi, 36 per cent in Guizhou and Xinjiang, 35 per cent in Sichuan and 30 per cent in Guangdong.64

The police run a compulsory drug treatment programme. Under the 1995 State Council Measures on Compulsory Drug Treatment, they set up treatment centres and are authorized to detain an addict for three to six months, with a possible extension to one year. By 2000, there were 746...
such centres in China, which have treated more than 224,000 drug users.\textsuperscript{65} The addicts (or normally their family) are required to pay for the cost involved,\textsuperscript{66} although a large number of addicts cannot afford the fee.\textsuperscript{67} However the police compulsory treatment is generally ineffective and the reported relapse rate is normally above 90 per cent.

Under Chinese law, a person who “re-takes” a dangerous drug can be sent for \textit{laojiao} for further treatment. This is normally interpreted as taking drugs after being treated by the police. Some \textit{laojiao} institutions are designed exclusively for drug users. For example, the \textit{Laojiao} Drug Treatment Centre in Chongqing city holds more than 2,000 drug addicts.\textsuperscript{68} The institution was initially the drug treatment unit of another \textit{laojiao} institution, and became independent in 1998. By 2001, it had treated more than 6,500 addicts.\textsuperscript{69} Others are mixed institutions that hold both drug addicts and other offenders. By 2000, there were 168 \textit{laojiao} institutions or brigades for drug treatment. In 1999, there were 120,000 drug addicts among China’s \textit{laojiao} populations.\textsuperscript{70}

The use of \textit{laojiao} on drug addicts presents difficult moral and legal issues. In Chinese law, the mere use of dangerous drugs is not a criminal offence, and drug addicts are regarded more as victims of China’s growing drug problem than its perpetrators. The main justification for lengthy incarceration is that it takes a minimum of three years to eliminate psychological dependence on drugs. Since the three-months-long police compulsory treatment is universally deemed to be a failure, the MoJ today is making the case that it takes years to toughen a drug addict psychologically against the temptation of drugs.\textsuperscript{71} The \textit{laojiao} is regarded as the best solution.

\textbf{Laojiao as investigative detention.} \textit{Laojiao} is also used to facilitate police investigations by prolonging detention beyond the period allowed by law. Where a person is suspected of having committed an offence, the police can send the person to \textit{laojiao} for further investigation. Only after the facts are clarified and sufficient evidence gathered would the police take further action.

\textit{Laojiao} as investigative detention has recently caused alarm among Chinese academic lawyers, who attribute its recent growth to the amendment in the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) in 1996 and the enhanced


\textsuperscript{66} State Council, Compulsory Drug Treatment Measures, Art. 15. The actual costs vary from one place to another. In Changsha, the capital of Hunan province, the cost is about 4,000 yuan for three months. In a county in Hunan province, the cost was 2,000 yuan for three months.


\textsuperscript{68} Deng Li, “Xiduzhe zai zheli huode xinsheng” (“Drug addicts are reborn here”), \textit{Zhongguo sifa}, No. 5 (2000), pp. 26–27.


\textsuperscript{70} State Council, \textit{Narcotics Control in China}.

\textsuperscript{71} Guo and Li, \textit{Prevention and Treatment}, p. 316.
evidential requirement in the criminal process. The reasoning goes as follows. Where there is a higher and more rigid evidential requirement because of the CPL reform, this will have an impact on all the criminal justice institutions. When a court gets tougher on evidence, a prosecutor will feel the pressure and in turn start to be more demanding of the police. The police, for one reason or another, find it difficult to meet the new legal requirements. A more rigorous scrutiny of evidence by the prosecution and the courts in the formal criminal process is forcing the police to seek alternatives in administrative penalties, including laojiao.72

Therefore, the improvement in case quality is fictitious and distorted. The quality of cases coming out of the criminal process may have improved because of the new requirement, but this is possibly because the prosecution has cherry-picked only the solid cases for criminal prosecution. Cases without sufficient evidence are either barred from entering the criminal process, or diverted from the formal process. The police and prosecution are working to “quarantine” the criminal process from administrative punishment so that the latter is prevented from “contaminating” the former. The most direct consequence of the CPL reform is that the Chinese police and prosecution are becoming more cautious about sloppy investigation and hasty prosecution, leaving badly prepared cases to other less visible mechanisms of control.

Of course, laojiao had served as an investigative tool in the past. The 1980 State Council Notice expressly provided that it was to be used to detain those who were suspected of having committed crimes. Zhang Xianglu, a laojiao officer from Qingdao Bureau of Justice, observed the informal practice between the police and the laojiao institution prior to 1996: “Where a principal offender in a criminal gang escaped and it is not possible to clarify the facts of a crime and determine criminal liability, [the accessories] would be sent to the laojiao on the basis of facts known [to the police]. The criminal liability would be further pursued once the principal is caught. In this type of laojiao case, the police would orally inform a laojiao institution [of the particular circumstance] when they send an offender to the institution.”73

The percentage of offenders serving laojiao as investigative detention is unknown because the police no longer inform laojiao institutions of such cases. According to sporadic statistics from laojiao institutions, the percentage is substantial and increasing. The national average is said to be 5 to 10 per cent. It was about 20 per cent in Guangdong province and as high as 37 per cent in Shandong province.74

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74. Ma Jianjun, “Laojiao production system.”
The MPS now expressly prohibits the use of *laojiao* to prolong the detention of criminal suspects. Nevertheless, *laojiao* as investigative detention is likely to continue principally because the police can still use it *after* a procuratorate decides not to prosecute a suspect and *after* a court decides to exempt a defendant from criminal punishment on the ground that the consequences of the case are too minor. Police can thus legitimately use *laojiao* in cases that are deemed as weak and insufficient by a procuratorate or a court.

**Laojiao as political control.** The percentage of political offenders under *laojiao* declined steadily from the 1950s to the early 1980s, reflecting the political and social changes occurring in Chinese society. But *laojiao* remains a useful instrument to punish the enemies of the state if need be. It was again extensively used in the early 1980s to punish people who were calling for further political liberalization and were critical of the government, either for having gone too far in changing the Maoist collective farming or not far enough in liberalizing the political system. People who posted anti-government posters, distributed pamphlets defaming senior CCP leaders or attempted to contact the Taiwan government and other “hostile” foreign governments frequently found their way to *laojiao* institutions. *Laojiao* was also extensively used as a supplement to the suppression of the 1989 student movement. A large number of students and workers who supported or sympathized with the democratic movement were subjected to *laojiao* while the organizers were punished by lengthy imprisonment or forced into exile.

The effectiveness of *laojiao* was forcefully demonstrated during the campaign against terrorism in Xinjiang. The aftermath of the September 11 attacks in the United States brought about important changes in China’s strategy against domestic terrorism. Rather than de-emphasizing terrorist acts in the mainland while at the same time launching a secret war on terrorism, China after September 11 has played up the terrorist threats it faces. For the first time, the government itself actively revealed details of terrorist organizations and terrorist activities in China and spread the message that it is also a victim of terrorism, arguing that it is thus justified in taking tough measures against domestic terrorists and terrorist organizations.

China’s political response to the September 11 attacks has been firm and positive. On the domestic front, it seized the opportunity to publicize

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75. The 2002 Measures, s. 4.
76. This is expressly authorized by s. 9 of the 2002 Measures.
the danger of terrorism on the mainland, Xinjiang in particular, and has tightened the crackdown on what is referred to as the three types of threats to national security: violent terrorism, ethnic separation and religious fundamentalism. It is estimated that China may have arrested roughly 900 separatists – almost all from Xinjiang – for terrorist activities.

The government is clearly placing many political offences under the umbrella of terrorism. Separatists and practitioners of “unlawful religions” were formerly punished as secessionists and subversives; they are now punished as terrorists. The government is treating religious practice as a cause of terrorism. Religious fanaticism is treated as the social foundation of terrorism in Xinjiang. But religious fanaticism is defined broadly, and Islam, in particular, is regarded as the breeding ground for militant Islam.

In police operations, the crackdown is further extended to the so-called unlawful religious activities of preaching or teaching Islam without the authorization of the government. For the police, it is legitimate to crack down on religious practice because religion has become the underlying driving force of separatist and terrorist activities in China. On a more pragmatic ground, the police have pointed out that religious schools have been used to train future separatists and terrorists. Religion and religious schools have become suspects.

Increasingly, the government is using laojiao to detain religion/ethnicity-based dissidents in Xinjiang. While the organizers and principals of terrorist activities are subject to harsh criminal penalties, their followers and sympathizers are subject to laojiao. They tend to have been involved in unlawful organizations, unlawful publications and unlawful religion, commonly referred to as three types of laojiao subjects. A study in a laojiao institution in Xinjiang revealed that political offenders are punished because of their involvement in “unlawful organizations and religions” (46.4 per cent), “printing unlawful publications and unlawful propaganda” (27.2 per cent), “concealing criminals and weapons” or otherwise “aiding unlawful organizations” (19.3 per cent), “unlawful manufacturing of explosives” or “unlawful border crossing” (7.1 per cent). They are normally poorly educated (80 per cent had less than senior high school education) and young (85 per cent were between the ages of 18 and 30). They are highly religious, resisted education and

83. Fu Hualing, “Counter-revolutionaries, subversives and terrorists: China’s evolving national security law,” in Fu Hualing, Carole Petersen and Simon N.M. Young (eds.), National Security and Fundamental Freedoms: Hong Kong’s Article 23 Under Scrutiny (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), ch. 2.
84. According to one estimate, 8,000 people have been detained under laojiao. See “Separatism and terrorism,” p. 13.
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labour in the institutions, and are said to be extremely difficult to manage. More and more of such “three types” persons are sent for laojiao and the number has been rising sharply.  

Laojiao has also played a crucial role in the government’s purge of falun gong practitioners. After falun gong was proscribed as an evil cult, the government launched a massive campaign against it and its believers. What characterizes the suppression of falun gong is the fact that criminal law has not been frequently used, and among the falun gong practitioners who have been punished by the criminal law, most are punished for the offence of illegal assemblies, sabotaging the implementation of law, disturbing public order, or other offences against property and persons. Instead, for most of the practitioners who actively petitioned against the government ban, administrative penalties, laojiao in particular, were the typical penalties that were used. It has been estimated that some 10,000 falun gong practitioners, normally the “low profile practitioners – rank and file followers – willing to publicly defend falun gong,” have been sent for different terms of laojiao. As the case of the falun gong has shown, the use of lesser administrative penalties can prove to be an effective alternative to using national security offences in combating unlawful religious activities.

Conclusion

Laojiao has been twisted and changed, often controversially, since its inception. As the direct result of a political campaign, laojiao in its early history served as a useful instrument for the CCP in suppressing and controlling people with dubious political backgrounds. Laojiao’s development largely followed the ebb and flow of the CCP’s political behaviour in the following decades. Created to effect a form of comparatively mild suppression of counterrevolutionary activities, laojiao then served as a useful instrument in meting out punishment against dissenting intellectuals in 1958. It was nearly phased out during the radical years of the Cultural Revolution but then expanded quickly as a result of the CCP’s anti-crime strategy after 1983. It has grown steadily ever since.

Laojiao remains faithful to its original purpose of suppressing dissidents, and has proved indispensable for maintaining the CCP’s political control, as demonstrated in campaigns against “rightists,” counterrevolutionaries, democracy activists, unionists, separatists, terrorists, and practitioners of falun gong and other cults. But at the same time, laojiao has grown and its function has been expanded to assist crime control,

targeting principally minor habitual offenders, especially migrants from rural areas.

The most important development of *laojiao* in the past two decades is its use in drug rehabilitation. The registered number of drug abusers has been steadily increasing and the short-term police compulsory drug treatment programme has proved ineffective. *Laojiao*, with its lengthy period of detention and flexibility in procedure, is regarded as a better alternative.

*Laojiao* thus serves multiple functions, with varying degree of legitimacy and justification. *Laojiao* as drug treatment is fundamentally different from *laojiao* as unlawful investigative detention; and *laojiao* as political control should be clearly distinguished from *laojiao* as a mechanism to punish habitual offenders. The lesson from this historical review is that *laojiao* serves multifold functions and punishes a variety of people. Any substantive discussion on its future has to be offence and offender specific.